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INTRODUCTION
Few legal canons are as well known to the general public as the
requirement that the prosecution prove the culpability of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. The popularity of the doctrine is such that
movies,' books,2 record albums,3 and even a radio show4 have been
named in its honor. Although the roots of the doctrine can be traced
back to the formative years of our Nation,5 the Supreme Court of the
United States crystallized it as binding precedent in the landmark de-
cision of In re Winship6 thirty-eight years ago. Despite the fact that
the Court has had various opportunities to flesh out the contours of
the doctrine, the meaning and scope of the doctrine remain unclear.
This Article will argue that the doctrine's lack of clarity is due to
the fact that although the Court has repeatedly held that the scope of
Winship depends on whether the prosecution is attempting to prove
an element of the offense, a defense, or a sentencing factor, the Court
has failed to put forth a theory that allows it to coherently distinguish
between these three elements of criminal responsibility. The Court's
confusing approach to the offense/defense/sentencing factor tristinc-
tion has created a host of conceptual perplexities. Chief amongst
these perplexities is the Court's conclusion that justification and ex-
cuse defenses do not trigger Winship protection, whereas certain sen-
tencing factors do. The concurrence or absence of justification or
excuse affects the defendant's guilt in a much more dramatic way than
the presence of a mere sentencing factor. After all, proof of a justifica-
tion or excuse generates a full-blown acquittal. In contrast, proof of
the absence of an aggravating factor merely reduces the amount of
punishment that a court may impose on the defendant.
Therefore, it was odd for the Court to conclude, as it did in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey,7 that aggravating factors should be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt because they affect the defendant's degree of
culpability, while simultaneously holding that justifications such as
1. See BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Bert E. Friedlob Productions 1956) and BE-
YOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Endeavour Productions 1980).
2. See RABBI SHMUEL WALDMAN, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Feldheim 2005)
(discussing the principal beliefs of Judaism) and BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Jeffrey
Archer, Play, 1986).
3. See JAY Z, REASONABLE DOUBT (Roc-a-Fella Records 1996) and LP & DAME
DASH, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Roc-a-Fella Records 2007) (recorded as a tribute to
Jay Z's seminal album). See also CANDIRIA, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (Too Damn
Hype 1997).
4. See Beyond Reasonable Doubt (BBC television broadcast 1996) (starring Robert
Kee as narrator).
5. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321, 681-82 (1st ed. 1954).
6. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
7. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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self-defense (Martin v. Ohio8 ) and excuses such as insanity (Leland v.
Oregon9 ) do not have to be disproved in the same manner. In light of
such conflicting statements, the Court should either abandon its post-
Apprendi insistence that aggravating factors trigger Winship protec-
tions because they affect the defendant's culpability, or revisit its deci-
sion to allow the State to shift the burden of proof with regards to
matters of justification and excuse. This Article contends that the
Court ought to do both.
Part I tracks the confusion regarding the offense/defense/sentenc-
ing factor tristinction back to the Mullaney v. Wilbur'0 and Patterson
v. New York" cases. More specifically, this Article argues that the
Court in Mullaney looked beyond the statutory definition of the crime
in order to define what counts as an element of the offense, whereas in
Patterson the Court determined what amounted to an offense element
by affording great deference to the way in which the legislature de-
fined the crime. Although the tension between these two approaches
is apparent, this Article contends that the weight of post-Mullaney au-
thority suggests that the Court presently favors Patterson's formalis-
tic 'legislative deference" approach to distinguishing offenses from
defenses.
Part II explains how the Court's sentencing factor jurisprudence
has contributed to further muddying the waters of the Winship doc-
trine. In Apprendi, the Court initially contended that sentencing fac-
tors that increase punishment beyond the statutorily prescribed
maximum for the crime trigger Winship protections because they af-
fect the defendant's "degree of guilt or culpability."12 However, the
Court later stated in the same opinion that the aggravating factor had
to be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt because it
constituted a "core" offense element.1a If it were true, as the Court
initially suggested, that factors significantly affecting the defendant's
guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then the Court ought
to re-examine its prior decisions to allow the State to shift the burdens
of proving self-defense,' 4 extreme emotional disturbance,' 5 insanity,' 6
and duress' 7 to the defendant. Surely all of these claims affect the
defendant's degree of culpability more than the aggravating factor in
8. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
9. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
10. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
11. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
12. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
13. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493.
14. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
15. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
16. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
17. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
650 [Vol. 44
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Apprendi. On the other hand, if aggravating factors trigger Winship
protections merely because they constitute de facto elements of the
offense, the Court would have no need to revisit previous jurispru-
dence because the pre-Apprendi line of cases have all been premised
on the essential distinction between offense and defense. However,
the Court would need to elaborate a workable conception of what ele-
ments should count as "core offense elements" that is compatible with
both its pre- and post-Apprendi jurisprudence.
Part III contends that no coherent conception of what amounts to
a "core offense element" can be surmised from the Court's "beyond a
reasonable doubt" jurisprudence. The reason for this lies in the fact
that the Court premised pre-Apprendi case law on a formalistic defini-
tion of what amounts to an offense, whereas the Court grounded post-
Apprendi case law on a substantive approach to the concept.
The leitmotif of pre-Apprendi jurisprudence was an insistence in
affording deference to legislative determinations of what factors re-
present "elements of an offense." The Court's assertion in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania's that the "state legislature's definition of the elements
of the offense is usually dispositive" illustrates this legislative defer-
ence model.19 The position championed in such cases stands in stark
contrast to the substantive approach advanced by the Court in its
post-Apprendi "beyond a reasonable doubt" jurisprudence. According
to this substantive approach, "the relevant inquiry is one not of form,"
but of substance. 20 Thus, as the Court stated in Apprendi, the fact
that "the state legislature placed its . .. sentence 'enhancer' within the
sentencing provisions of the criminal code does not mean that the find-
ing of [the sentence enhancer] is not an essential element of the
offense."21
In light of the tension between the legislative deference and sub-
stantive approaches to the offense/defense/sentencing factor tristinc-
tion, this Article argues that the Court has boxed itself into a corner,
and is now unable to put forth a definition of what counts as an of-
fense without calling into question its previous case law. There are
four different ways of conceptualizing what amounts to an offense,
none of which is entirely compatible with Supreme Court precedent.
A formalistic conception of the offense would encompass solely the ele-
ments expressly designated by the legislature as constitutive of a
criminal offense. This conflicts with the Court's assertion in Apprendi
that "[legislative labels] do not afford an acceptable answer" to ques-
18. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
19. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
20. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
21. Id. at 467.
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tions about whether an aggravating factor should be deemed to be an
element of the offense or a sentencing factor. 22 On the other hand, an
offense can be substantively defined as a basic type of wrong that does
not include an assessment of fault or blameworthiness. 23 This concep-
tion cannot be squared with Apprendi, for the aggravating factor at
issue (crime was committed with a biased racial purpose) does not
qualify the basic wrong committed by the defendant (illegal weapon
possession), but rather increases the defendant's fault or blamewor-
thiness for having engaged in the basic wrong. A third way of conceiv-
ing the offense is considering that it includes not only the prohibitory
norm (do not kill!), but also the absence of a justification that affords a
permission to infringe the prohibitory norm (you can kill in self-de-
fense!). This position is at odds with the Court's conclusion in Martin
that the absence of self-defense is not an "element of the offense." Fi-
nally, an offense can be conceived as encompassing every element rel-
evant to criminal liability, including the infraction of the prohibitory
norm and the absence of both justification and excuse. This would be
incompatible with pre- and post-Apprendi cases in which the Court
has refused to extend the Winship protections to issues of justification
and excuse.
Part IV argues that the Court has avoided confronting the afore-
mentioned problems by shifting its inquiry in post-Apprendi cases
from whether the aggravating factor constitutes an "element of the
offense" in accordance with Winship, to whether the defendant should
be entitled to a jury finding the existence of the aggravating factor
beyond a reasonable doubt. The problem with this shift is that there
is no necessary connection between the jury trial guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment 24 and the due process requirement that the offense
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court has repeatedly
stated that it is not necessarily unconstitutional to have the jury find
the non-existence of a factor, relevant to the defendant's ultimate pun-
ishment (extreme emotional disturbance, self-defense), by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.
Finally, Part V advances what will be called the "unlawful act"
approach to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine. According to
the "unlawful act" theory, courts should require the State to prove be-
22. Id. at 494.
23. This type of supra-statutory definition of an offense is defended by various
criminal law theorists. See, e.g., John Gardner, Fletcher on Offences and Defenses, 39
TULSA L. REv. 817, 824-25 (2004). See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAw 562 (2000). The author recently defended a similar supra-statutory approach to
defining criminal offenses in Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish? Harm, Vic-
timhood and the Structure ofAnti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 Miss. L. J. 1 (2008) [hereinafter,
Why is it a Crime].
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in an act prohib-
ited by law. Taking a cue from H.L.A. Hart's definition of
punishment, this Article contends that the imposition of punishment
is incoherent without proof that the actor performed an act that is
against a legal rule.25 An act amounts to an offense against legal
rules if, and only if, it satisfies the elements of an offense and is per-
formed without legal justification. Take, for example, the case of a po-
lice officer who shoots and injures a fleeing felon. While he satisfied
the elements of the offense of assault (intentionally injuring a human
being), his conduct was not prohibited by law because he had legal
justification (law enforcement authority) for engaging in the act. In
such cases, the imposition of punishment would not only be unfair, but
also incoherent given that one can only be punished for having en-
gaged in conduct against legal rules. If the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" requirement is to mean anything, it must at least stand for the
proposition that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that which would make the imposition of punishment logically
plausible (for example, that the defendant engaged in an unlawful
act). Thus, the State should have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
both the elements of the offense and the non-existence of legal
justification.26
On the other hand, good reasons exist to exclude excuse defenses
from the scope of the Winship rule. Although punishing an excused
actor is unfair, it is not incoherent, for excused conduct is still consid-
ered unlawful. Thus, despite the fact that punishing an insane of-
fender would strike many as unfair, doing so would not be logically
problematic, for the offender's insanity does not negate the criminality
of his act.27 While due process surely cannot tolerate incoherence or
arbitrariness, it does tolerate some amount of "unfairness" as long as
the State can prove that the unfairness furthers an important inter-
est. Consequently, courts should permit the prosecution to disprove
matters of excuse by a preponderance of the evidence insofar as it is
not considered fundamentally unfair.
25. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1967).
26. In the police officer's case this would require the State to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt both that he injured a person (elements of the offense of assault) and that
he did not act pursuant to law enforcement authority (elements of the justification).
The prosecution, of course, does not have to disprove the existence of justifications un-
less the defendant has first put forth some evidence ofjustification. In other words, the
defense has the burden of production with regard to justifications, but once that burden
has been met, the prosecution has the burden of disproving justifications beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
27. This explains why some jurisdictions have adopted a "guilty but mentally ill"
verdict. This might be unfair, but it is certainly not logically incoherent.
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By the same token, sentencing factors should not trigger the ap-
plication of the Winship rule. In order for sentencing factors to be-
come relevant, the trier of fact must first find that the defendant
engaged in an act prohibited by law. Consequently, such factors are,
by definition, immaterial to establishing the unlawfulness of the act.
As a result, sentencing factors would not trigger the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" rule under the "unlawful act" approach to the doctrine. 28
This, of course, does not mean that a jury should not be entitled to
find the existence of an aggravating factor. Given that there is no nec-
essary connection between the "beyond a reasonable doubt" require-
ment and the right to a jury trial, the values underlying the Sixth
Amendment could sensibly lead a court to hold that a jury is entitled
to find the existence of an aggravating factor while simultaneously
holding that Winship does not require that such a finding be made
beyond a reasonable doubt. At first glance, this approach might seem
wholly incompatible with the Court's post-Apprendi case law. How-
ever, it would appear that the Court's main concern in such cases is
the right to a jury trial and not the "beyond a reasonable doubt" doc-
trine. Thus, upon closer inspection, the Court might be more receptive
to the position advanced here than one would originally believe.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONFLATION OF THE OFFENSE/
DEFENSE DISTINCTION
It is difficult to explain why the Supreme Court of the United
States has been unable to fully grasp the scope and implications of the
offense/defense/sentencing factor tristinction. This Part will focus on
the Court's inability to coherently distinguish offenses from defenses,
as illustrated by the seemingly incompatible Mullaney v. Wilbur29 and
Patterson v. New York 30 holdings. Before doing so, however, it is nec-
essary to detail the historical evolution of the crime of homicide.
Given that both Mullaney and Patterson involved a charge of murder,
it is difficult to understand the issues at stake in these cases without
first elucidating the nature and scope of the crime charged.
28. This is not to say, however, that due process concerns are never implicated in
this context. Take, for example, an aggravating factor that increases punishment to
such an extent that it would offend notions of fundamental fairness to allow it to be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence (e.g., punishment without proof of aggravat-
ing factor = five years, whereas punishment with proof of aggravating factor = ninety-
nine years). In such cases there would be powerful reasons in favor of concluding that
the aggravating factor should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
29. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
30. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
[Vol. 44654
WHEN AN OFFENSE IS NOT AN OFFENSE
A. THE COMMON LAw DEFINITION OF MURDER FROM COKE TO THE
MAINE PENAL CODE
In the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke defined murder as
the "kill[ing] . . . [of] any reasonable creature under the king's peace,
with malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party or implied by
law."3 1 In contrast, as Sir Matthew Hale asserted in his History of the
Pleas of the Crown, manslaughter was defined as the killing of a
human being "without forethought malice."32 Consequently, whether
a killing amounted to murder or manslaughter at common law hinged
on whether it was committed with malice (murder) or not
(manslaughter).
A killing is malicious depending on whether it was committed in
the "heat of passion" (not malicious) or not (malicious). The difference
between murder and manslaughter, therefore, is that manslaughter
"arises from the sudden heat of the passions," whereas murder stems
from the "wickedness of the heart."33 Malice and passion are thus two
sides of the same coin. A malicious killing is, by definition, a killing
not committed in the heat of passion. Contrarily, a killing committed
in the heat of passion is, by definition, not malicious. Thus, as Joel
Prentiss Bishop stated in his Commentaries on the Criminal Law,
"'passion' and 'malice' are deemed to be inconsistent motive powers; so
that if an act proceeds from the one, it does not also proceed from the
other."34
American courts were quick to embrace the common law distinc-
tion between murder and manslaughter. In the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury case of Stokes v. State,35 for example, the Supreme Court of
Georgia held that if the defendant could prove that he killed as a re-
sult of a "sudden, violent heat of passion," the killing "would be ...
manslaughter" rather than murder.36 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held in 1850 that "[t]here must be sudden passion . . . to
negative the idea of malice."37
The common law definitions of murder and malice eventually
found their way into most American penal codes. Before the publica-
tion of the Model Penal Code,38 every single American jurisdiction had
adopted a statutory definition of murder that was either identical to or
31. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *47.
32. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *424 (E. and R.
Nutt & R. Gosling 1736).
33. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *190.
34. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 697.
35. 18 Ga. 17 (1855).
36. Stokes v. State, 18 Ga. 17 (1855).
37. Young v. State, 30 Tenn. 200 (1850).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.01-405.4 (1962).
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built upon the common law definition of the offense.39 Thus, the Cali-
fornia Penal Code 40 defined murder as "the unlawful killing of a
human being . .. with malice aforethought."4 1 Manslaughter, on the
other hand, is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being with-
out malice."42 Section 192(a) of the California Penal Code also holds
that a "sudden quarrel or heat of passion" negates malice. 43
Similarly, the Maine 1964 murder statute44 provided that
"[w]hoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice afore-
thought . . . is guilty of murder."4 5 In contrast, the statute provided
that "[wihoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion,
without ... malice aforethought" is guilty of manslaughter instead of
murder.46 This was the murder statute that provided the backdrop
for the Court's landmark decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur.47
B. UNRAVELING THE MULLANEY/PATTERSON RIDDLE
1. The Problem
Although the substantive law of murder remained remarkably
stable from the times of Sir Edward Coke and Sir Matthew Hale to the
time of publication of the Model Penal Code,48 the procedural rules
governing murder prosecutions were in significant flux during this pe-
riod. One particularly vexing procedural issue generating considera-
ble disagreement amongst courts and commentators was whether
courts could lawfully require the defendant to prove that the defen-
dant acted in the heat of passion in order for the defendant to be pun-
ished for manslaughter rather than murder. 49
A landmark case handed down by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1845, Commonwealth v. York,50 held that the defen-
dant could constitutionally have the burden of proving that the defen-
dant acted in the heat of passion by a preponderance of the evidence.5 '
39. See generally the comments to MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt (1962) (stating
that "it was the pattern of this country prior to the Model Penal Code to incorporate the
common law [of murder] in some jurisdictions and to build upon it in others").
40. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ I-IV.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a).
42. Id. at § 192.
43. § 192(a).
44. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2651 (1964).
45. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964) (repealed 1975).
46. Id. at § 2551 (repealed 1975).
47. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
48. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.01-405.4 (1962).
49. See generally George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative
Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 902-10
(1968).
50. 50 Mass. 93 (1845).
51. Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 93, 124-25 (1845).
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Several states subsequently followed suit. 5 2 Other courts, however,
concluded that once the defendant has come forward with some evi-
dence that the killing was perpetrated in the heat of passion, the pros-
ecution must prove the absence of such exculpatory circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt.53
2. The Mullaney Case
In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States weighed in on
the issue in Mullaney v. Wilbur.54 The case arose under the Maine
murder statute55 discussed in the previous subsection. 56 After the de-
fendant presented evidence to demonstrate that he killed the victim
while in the heat of passion, the trial court instructed the jury that the
defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant committed the offense in that manner. 7 If
the defendant failed to meet that burden, the jury was to conclusively
infer that he acted with malice and thus convict him of murder rather
than manslaughter.5 8 The jury found the defendant guilty of
murder.59
The defendant appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
contending that his conviction violated his due process rights. Citing
In re Winship,60 the defendant argued that his guilty verdict could
stand only if the prosecution had proved all elements of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.61 Regarding the substantive law
governing his case, he claimed that malice aforethought was an essen-
tial element of a murder offense, and that under Maine law, a killing
committed in the heat of passion is not malicious. Since malice and
heat of passion have been joined at the hip since the early common
law, the defendant reasoned that the trial court committed prejudicial
error when it failed to require the prosecution to prove the absence of
passion beyond a reasonable doubt.62
52. Quillen v. State, 110 A.2d 445 (Del. 1955); State v. Ballou, 40 A. 861 (R.I. 1891);
State v. Sappienza, 95 N.E. 381 (Ohio 1911).
53. See generally Territory v. Lucero, 46 P. 18, 21 (N.M. Terr. 1896) (holding that
the prosecution has the ultimate burden of disproving exculpatory circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt and asserting that "courts and commentators have, especially
of late, denied [Commonwealth v. York] as a sound legal principle, and condemned it as
an excrescence upon the law").
54. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
55. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2651 (1964).
56. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
57. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686 (1975).
58. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686.
59. Id. at 687.
60. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
61. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 687.
62. Id.
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The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the defen-
dant's interpretation of the Maine murder statute. The court held
that murder and manslaughter were not two distinct offenses in
Maine but instead different degrees of the same crime of "felonious
homicide." 63 The court also concluded that whoever unjustifiably kills
a human being commits the offense of felonious homicide regardless of
whether or not he acted in the heat of passion.64 Consequently, the
court noted that the only true element of the offense that the prosecu-
tion was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt was the "unlaw-
fulness" of the killing. On the other hand, malice and heat of passion
were considered sentencing factors affecting the degree of punishment
imposed on the offender rather than the nature of the offense commit-
ted. Finally, the court concluded that malice and heat of passion were
not "elements of the crime charged" triggering application of the rule
laid down in Winship.65 As a result, the court held that the trial court
did not err in instructing the jury that reducing the defendant's re-
sponsibility from murder to manslaughter required the defendant
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he killed in the heat of
passion.
Subsequently, the defendant successfully petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The district court agreed
with defense counsel that malice was an essential element of the of-
fense of murder and that the prosecution was constitutionally re-
quired to prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore,
given that passion negates malice, the district court ruled that requir-
ing the defendant to prove that he killed in the heat of passion ran
afoul of the Winship rule. The district court thus overturned the de-
fendant's conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed.
3. The Supreme Court's Mullaney Opinion and the "Impact on
Punishment" Test for Determining What Counts as an
Element of the Offense
In affirming the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit's decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Mullaney v.
Wilbur 66 accepted the state interpretation of the Maine murder stat-
ute and acknowledged that, "as a formal matter the absence of the
heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a 'fact necessary to con-
63. State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 146 (Me. 1971).
64. Wilbur, 278 A.2d at 146.
65. Id.
66. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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stitute the crime' of felonious homicide in Maine."67 Nevertheless, the
Court refused to afford constitutional significance to Maine's treat-
ment of the presence or absence of "passion" as an aggravating or miti-
gating factor rather than as an element of the crime of homicide.
According to the Court, "[In re] Winship68 is concerned with substance
rather than this kind of formalism."69 The Court's insistence on sub-
stance over form in this context stemmed in part from a concern that
"if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as de-
fined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that
decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in
its law" by merely "redefin[ing] the elements that constitute different
crimes" and "characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the
extent of punishment."70
In spite of the Court's laudable attempt to reject formalistic ap-
proaches to the Winship doctrine, the nature of the substantive test
laid down in Mullaney is unclear. The beauty of the formalistic ap-
proach advocated by the State of Maine lay in its simplicity. Under
Maine's formalistic approach, Winship would only require that the
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts the legislature
labeled as "elements of the offense." The substantive approach cham-
pioned by the Supreme Court cannot be applied so easily. If the
State's definition of the crime is not controlling for the purposes of the
Winship doctrine, how should courts determine whether a fact not in-
cluded within the statutory definition of the crime amounts in sub-
stance to an "element of the offense" that must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt?
The Supreme Court addressed this concern by advocating in favor
of what this Article will call the "impact on punishment" test for deter-
mining what counts as an element of the offense for Winship purposes.
According to the "impact on punishment" test, the arguments in favor
of considering a given fact as an element of the crime become more
powerful when the presence or absence of the fact has a significant
bearing on the amount of punishment to be imposed on the offender.71
This test explains why the Court intimated that because "the conse-
quences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a ver-
dict of manslaughter, differ significantly," malice ought to be treated
as an element of the offense proven by the prosecution beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.72 The test also explains why the Court buttressed its
67. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697 (1975).
68. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
69. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 699.
70. Id. at 698.
71. Id. at 698-99.
72. Id. at 698.
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holding by pointing out that "when viewed in terms of the potential
difference in restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each convic-
tion, the distinction established by Maine between murder and man-
slaughter may be of greater importance than the difference between
guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes."73 In sum, the "impact on
punishment" approach coherently explains why the Court held that
malice amounted to an element of the offense of homicide for Winship
purposes and that the State of Maine could not constitutionally re-
quire that the defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant did not act with malice (or, that he killed in the
heat of passion).
4. Mullaney After Patterson v. New York. The Death of the "Impact
on Punishment" Test
Twenty-three years before Mullaney v. Wilbur74 was decided, the
Supreme Court of the United States held in Leland v. Oregon75 that
states could lawfully shift the burden of proving insanity to the defen-
dant. Mullaney did not overrule Leland, and Leland continues to be
good law to this day. However, an obvious tension exists between the
"impact on punishment" test defended in Mullaney and the Court's
decision in Leland. If whether the existence or non-existence of a fact
has a significant impact on the amount of punishment a court will
impose on the accused ultimately determines whether the fact is con-
sidered an element of the offense, how can the presence or absence of
insanity not amount to an element of the crime? After all, the pres-
ence or absence of insanity has an even more drastic effect on punish-
ment than the existence or non-existence of malice.
In the landmark case of Patterson v. New York,76 the Supreme
Court of the United States dissolved the apparent tension existing be-
tween Leland and Mullaney in 1977. The defendant in Patterson was
charged with second degree murder. The relevant murder statute de-
fined the offense charged as "[intentionally causing] the death of an-
other person."77 Malice was thus not considered an element of the
crime. The New York statute also provided that killings committed
while "under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse" should be punished as
manslaughter rather than murder.78 According to New York law,
however, the defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance
73. Id.
74. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
75. 343 U.S. 79 (1952).
76. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
77. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
78. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(l)(a) (McKinney 1975).
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of the evidence that the defendant killed under an extreme emotional
disturbance ("EED").
Although the defendant confessed to the killing, he contended at
trial that he committed the crime while under the influence of an
EED. A jury found him guilty of murder. While the defendant's ap-
peal to the Court of Appeals of New York was pending, the Supreme
Court decided Mullaney. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion, noting that the burden of proving EED could be constitutionally
shifted to the defendant given that EED amounted to a free standing
affirmative defense that had no direct bearing on the elements of the
offense of murder. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine
whether Mullaney barred the State from shifting the burden of prov-
ing EED to the defendant.
At first glance, the argument that the State should be required to
prove the absence of EED beyond a reasonable doubt seemed compel-
ling. After all, the partial mitigation afforded by the EED defense was
the Model Penal Code79 counterpart to the common law "heat of pas-
sion" excuse.80 Furthermore, if the In re Winship8l doctrine was truly
concerned with substance rather than form, the State's contention
that the existence or non-existence of EED had no bearing on the ele-
ments of the offense of murder rang hollow. What could be more for-
malistic than circumventing the Winship rule by merely eliminating
the word "malice" from a murder statute and substituting the "heat of
passion" defense with an almost identical excuse of EED? This ap-
peared to be the kind of legislative maneuver that the Supreme Court
was trying to curb by adopting the "impact on punishment" test in
Mullaney.
Surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court held in Patterson that
New York could shift the burden of proving EED to the defendant
without running afoul of the Winship and Mullaney requirements.
Citing Leland, the Court argued that if the State could constitution-
ally require the defendant to prove the full affirmative defense of in-
sanity by a preponderance of the evidence, it could a fortiori demand
that the defendant prove the partial defense of EED.82 The logic of
this argument is unassailable. If Leland is to remain good law, no
reason exists for courts to require partial or full excuses to be proven
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The problem with the
Court's analysis is that, as pointed out above, Leland is at odds with
Mullaney.
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 (1962).
80. See generally comments to MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.
81. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
82. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977).
661
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
In order to escape this contradiction, the Court contended that
Mullaney held that a state "may not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant by presuming [an] ingredient [of the offense] upon proof of
the other elements of the offense."83 Thus, according to the Court's
reformulation of the Mullaney rule, Maine could not constitutionally
require that the defendant prove "passion" by a preponderance of the
evidence because it impermissibly presumed the existence of the es-
sential element of malice (the absence of "passion") upon proof of the
unlawful nature of the killing.
The Court's reformulation of the Mullaney rule both dissolved the
tension between Mullaney and Leland and explained why the Patter-
son holding is compatible with Mullaney. In doing so, however, the
Court paid short shrift to its previous assertion that Winship was con-
cerned with substance rather than form. According to this revised
version of the Mullaney holding, Maine could circumvent the Winship
rule by merely getting rid of the presumption of malice and redefining
malice in a way that makes no reference to the lack of "passion."
Maine could do so even if it continued to hold that defendants ought to
be punished for murder instead of manslaughter depending on
whether they killed in the heat of passion or not. Thus, Maine may
shift to the defendant the burden of proving that he should be pun-
ished for manslaughter rather than murder without effecting any
change in the heat of passion doctrine. This is formalism at its best.
To its credit, the Court acknowledged that the view adopted in
Patterson may permit state legislatures to get around the Winship
rule by merely labeling as an affirmative defense a fact that was pre-
viously considered an element of the offense.84 Nevertheless, the
Court held that a more stringent view such as the one grounded on the
"impact on punishment" test that had seemingly been championed in
Mullaney should be rejected because the determination of whether
proof of a fact has a bearing on establishing an affirmative defense as
opposed to an element of the crime has traditionally "been left to the
legislative branch."85 And thus was born in one fell swoop what this
Article calls the "legislative deference" approach to determining the
facts triggering Winship rule application. Since then, the continued
vitality of this approach has been reaffirmed by the Court on several
occasions.
83. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 210.
85. Id.
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II. RESURRECTING THE "IMPACT ON PUNISHMENT" TEST:
APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY AND ITS PROGENY
Given that the Supreme Court of the United States had endorsed
the legislative deference approach to defining criminal offenses for
several decades, it came as a surprise when more than thirty years
after Patterson v. New York86 the Supreme Court resurrected the "im-
pact on punishment" test in a series of cases holding that the prosecu-
tion had the burden of proving some aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt even if the state legislature had expressly refused to
label them as elements of the offense. This Part will examine the cases
that led to this unexpected development and explain why this ap-
proach is in tension with Patterson and its progeny.
A. THE BEGINNING: Apprendi v. New Jersey
The defendant in Apprendi v. New Jersey87 was charged under
New Jersey law with possessing a firearm for an unlawful purpose.88
The offense was punishable by a term of five to ten years of imprison-
ment. Upon conviction, however, New Jersey's so-called "hate crime"
statute authorized the trial judge to impose punishment of up to ten
additional years of imprisonment if the trial judge found by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant committed the crime "with
a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because
of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnic-
ity."89 The defendant pled guilty to the offense charged. After the
parties filed the plea agreement, the prosecutor requested the trial
judge sentence the defendant to a term in excess of the statutorily pre-
scribed punishment for the offense charged, given that the crime was
committed with a "biased purpose." Following an evidentiary hearing
wherein both parties had the opportunity to present evidence to prove
or disprove the presence of the aggravating factor, the trial judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did in
fact commit the crime with a hateful purpose. As a result, the court
sentenced the defendant to a twelve-year term of imprisonment.
The defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that
the Due Process Clause90 as construed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in In re Winship9e required that the finding of bias upon
which his increased sentence was based be proved beyond a reasona-
86. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
87. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:39-4(a) (West 1995).
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
91. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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ble doubt. The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the defendant's
claim and held that the hate crime provision at issue amounted to an
aggravating sentencing factor rather than an essential element of the
offense triggering Winship protections.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to ascertain "whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a fac-
tual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison
sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the
basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."92 A sharply divided Court
held that it did and thus reversed the defendant's conviction. Writing
for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens began by pointing out that
under New Jersey law, the defendant could be punished by up to ten
years of imprisonment for unlawfully possessing a weapon, and for an
additional ten years for having committed the crime with a biased
purpose.93 The Justice then claimed that "as a matter of simple jus-
tice, it seems obvious that the procedural safeguards designed to pro-
tect [defendant] from unwarranted [punishment] should apply equally
to the two acts that New Jersey has singled out for punishment."94
Therefore, Justice Stevens reasoned that "merely using the label 'sen-
tence enhancement' to describe the latter surely does not provide a
principled basis for treating them differently."95 Ultimately, as was
made clear in the latter portions of the majority opinion, "the relevant
inquiry is one not of form, but of effect."96
The Court then turned to explain how its holding was also but-
tressed by the principles laid down in Mullaney v. Wilbur.97 In lan-
guage reminiscent of the "impact on punishment" test rejected in
Patterson v. New York,98 the majority argued that one of the chief
principles undergirding the Mullaney decision was that "criminal law
is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract, but also
with the degree of criminal culpability."99 Therefore, Justice Stevens
contended that "because the consequences of a guilty verdict for mur-
der and for manslaughter differed substantially," the State of Maine
in Mullaney could not circumvent the Winship rule by merely charac-
terizing a fact as a sentencing factor rather than as an element of the
offense. Once the Mullaney rule was formulated in this manner, the
Court easily concluded that New Jersey could not avoid triggering the
92. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
93. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 494.
97. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
98. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
99. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485.
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due process burden of proof protections by merely labeling a fact a
"sentencing factor" rather than an "element of the offense."100
Having fleshed out the meaning and scope of Mullaney, the Court
then turned to examining the effect that New Jersey's hate crime stat-
ute could have on the amount of punishment imposed on the defen-
dant. After doing so, the Court concluded that "it can hardly be
[argued] that the potential doubling of one's sentence-from 10 years
to 20-has no more than a nominal effect."' 01 The majority then went
on to hold that judged both in terms of the additional amount of jail
time a defendant faces if the court finds a biased purpose, and the
"more severe stigma" that attaches to an offender convicted of a hate
crime, "the differential here is unquestionably of constitutional signifi-
cance." 102 As a result, the Court asserted that the so-called sentenc-
ing factor at issue in Apprendi was "clearly" the functional equivalent
of an element of the offense and ruled in favor of the defendant.
B. APPRENDiS PROGENY
Four years after Apprendi v. New Jersey'03 was decided, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held in Blakely v. Washington 04
that a statutorily enumerated fact that served as a ground for increas-
ing the defendant's punishment beyond the "standard range" pre-
scribed for the commission of the offense could not constitutionally
justify enhancing a sentence unless such a fact was either admitted by
the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker'05 that
defendants have a right to have a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt
the presence of aggravating factors used to calibrate the amount of
punishment imposed pursuant to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines' 06 . Similarly, the Court ruled in Cunningham v. Califor-
nia'07 that the statutorily enumerated aggravating factors listed
under California's determinate sentencing scheme could serve only as
the basis for increasing a sentence if a defendant admitted these fac-
tors or a jury found their existence beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
Apprendi's substantive approach to defining criminal offenses appar-
ently remains alive and well today.
100. Id. at 496.
101. Id. at 495.
102. Id. It should be noted that there are significant jury trial issues implicated by
Apprendi as well. These issues are discussed in more detail in Part IV, infra.
103. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
104. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
105. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
106. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL AND APPENDI-
CES (2009), http://www.ussc.gov/2009guid/GL2009.pdf.
107. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
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C. THE APPRENDI-PATTERSON RIDDLE
The Blakely v. Washington,08 United States v. Booker,109 and
Cunningham v. California"o decisions did not come as a surprise, as
they seemed to follow naturally from the principles put forth in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey."' What was surprising, however, was that the
Supreme Court of the United States revived the Mullaney v. Wilbur"12
"impact on punishment" test in order to justify its holding in Apprendi
that sentencing factors ought to be considered the functional
equivalent of elements of the offense. After Patterson v. New York,1 3
most courts and commentators believed that the Court would deter-
mine whether a fact should be treated as an essential element of the
crime for In re Winship"14 purposes by affording great, if not com-
plete, deference to the way in which legislatures decided to define the
elements of the offense. It thus seemed that the "legislative defer-
ence" model had triumphed over the Mullaney "impact on punish-
ment" test.
The Supreme Court's post-Patterson "beyond a reasonable doubt"
jurisprudence corroborated this impression. In Martin v. Ohio," 5 for
example, the Court ruled that a defendant could lawfully be required
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in justifiable
self-defense, as long as the statute at issue labeled self-defense an "af-
firmative defense" rather than a negation of an "element of the of-
fense."" 6 By the same token, the Court in Dixon v. United States"x7
recently held that it is not contrary to due process to shift the burden
of proving duress to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence,
given that duress was an excuse defense that had no bearing on the
elements of the offense charged." 8
The Martin and Dixon decisions seem to be at odds with the "im-
pact on punishment" test advanced by the Court first in Mullaney and
later in Apprendi. It is problematic for the Court to hold that the pros-
ecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a fact that serves as the
basis for significantly increasing the length of a defendant's sentence
(Mullaney, Apprendi), while simultaneously contending that the state
may require a defendant to prove self-defense or duress by a prepon-
108. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
109. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
110. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
111. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
112. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
113. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
114. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
115. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
116. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 230 (1987) (emphasis added).
117. 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
118. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 8 (2006).
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derance of the evidence (Martin, Dixon). Ultimately, it is undeniable
that the presence or absence of self-defense or duress has an even
greater bearing on the defendant's punishment than the presence or
absence of "passion" or aggravating factors such as the ones at issue in
Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham.
As a result of the obvious tension between the Supreme Court's
pre- and post-Apprendi "beyond a reasonable doubt" jurisprudence, it
is worth asking whether there is a way of harmonizing these seem-
ingly incompatible lines of cases in a coherent manner. Although the
Court has never addressed this thorny problem, one potential way out
of the Apprendi /Patterson conundrum is to maintain that the Winship
rule only bars the state from requiring that a defendant disprove an
element of the offense, whereas the rule does not prohibit a state from
demanding that a defendant prove a defense that reduces or elimi-
nates the defendant's guilt or culpability without negating the com-
mission of the elements of the crime.
At first glance, this would seem to solve the problem, given that
the Court's Patterson, Martin, and Dixon decisions all involved claims
about whether the prosecution should be required to disprove a de-
fense of justification or excuse beyond a reasonable doubt, rather
than about whether the defendant could be required to disprove an
element of the offense. Self-defense, duress, and extreme emotional
disturbance ("EED") have always been treated as defenses that either
partially or fully negate a defendant's guilt for having performed con-
duct admittedly satisfying the elements of a criminal offense.
On the other hand, both Apprendi and Mullaney could be con-
strued as cases involving claims about whether the defendant should
be required to negate an element of the offense by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than about whether the prosecution ought to dis-
prove a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Factors such as whether
the crime was committed with a "biased purpose"119 (Apprendi) or
"cruelty" (Booker)120 are routinely treated in many jurisdictions as el-
ements of an offense. Furthermore, as this Article's brief recount of
the evolution of the definition of murder revealed, "passion" (Mulla-
ney) has long been considered by courts and commentators to be inex-
tricably linked to the central element of the offense of murder (malice).
Although it could certainly be argued that the heat of passion func-
tions more as an excuse than as a negation of an essential element of
119. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (2005) (biased purpose is an element of
the Illinois hate crime statute).
120. In Georgia, for example, a person commits a first degree felony if he engages in
"cruelty" to children. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70 (2009). Similarly, animal abuse
statutes criminalize engaging in "cruelty" or "aggravated cruelty" to animals. See, e.g.,
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. §§ 331-79.
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the crime of murder,121 it can also be contended that "passion" consti-
tutes the mirror image of "deliberation"-the chief element of the most
common kind of first degree murder.122
Once the Supreme Court's precedents are recast in this manner,
it is possible to make sense of pre- and post-Apprendi jurisprudence in
an integrated and coherent way. According to this reformulation, the
Patterson line of cases stands for the proposition that the defendant
may constitutionally be required to prove the concurrence of a "de-
fense" that partly or wholly reduces his culpability for having engaged
in conduct that nevertheless satisfies the elements of the offense
charged. In contrast, Mullaney and Apprendi and its progeny could be
construed to hold that the state may not lawfully demand that a de-
fendant disprove an element of the offense by a preponderance of the
evidence. In sum, the Mullaney /ApprendilPatterson riddle may be
unraveled by conceiving the "beyond a reasonable doubt" jurispru-
dence as the Supreme Court's attempt to allocate burdens of proof in
accordance with the fundamental offense/defense distinction.
III. DEFINING CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND THE COHERENCE
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO THE
OFFENSE/DEFENSE/SENTENCING FACTOR
TRISTINCTION
If the offense/defense distinction is going to be the touchstone of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine, the Supreme Court of the
United States case law ought to at least provide a coherent framework
for determining what should count as an "element of the offense."
This Part argues, however, that there is no workable conception of
what amounts to an element of an offense that is compatible with the
Supreme Court's pre- and post-Apprendi v. New Jerseyl23 jUrispru-
dence. As a result, the Supreme Court's reliance on the offense/de-
fense distinction as the cornerstone of its "beyond a reasonable doubt"
jurisprudence is problematic not because it is wrong to place so much
emphasis on the distinction, but rather because the Court's case law
cannot be interpreted in a way that provides a coherent way of con-
struing the distinction.
121. This is the position cogently defended by Joshua Dressler in his seminal Re-
thinking the Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. OF CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).
122. For a statute that takes "deliberation" to be one of the distinguishing features
of first degree murder, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2002).
123. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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A. FORmVIALISTIc DEFINITION OF "OFFENSE"
1. The Approach
One obvious way of defining an offense is solely by making refer-
ence to the elements of crimes as defined by the legislature. This ap-
proach commands wide acceptance amongst many common and civil
law courts and commentators. With regard to Anglo-American law,
Joshua Dressler, for example, has stated that according to "many judi-
cial opinions and treatises, a 'crime' is anything that lawmakers say is
a crime."124 Similarly, Spanish criminal law theorists Francisco
Mufioz Conde and Mercedes Garcia Ardn have defined a criminal of-
fense as "the legislator's description of prohibited conduct in a penal
norm."125
General defenses, in contrast, represent special circumstances
identified by the legislator that exculpate conduct that nevertheless
satisfies the statutory definition of a criminal offense. Defenses can be
of three types, namely: justifications, excuses, and non-exculpatory de-
fenses.126 A defense amounts to a justification when it negates the
wrongfulness or unlawfulness of the act.127 The paradigmatic justifi-
cation is the choice of the lesser evils or necessity defense.128 Excuse
defenses, on the other hand, negate the defendant's blameworthiness
or guilt for having engaged in what admittedly amounts to an unlaw-
ful act. Insanity is often cited as an example of an excuse defense.
Obviously, insane offenders engaging in conduct satisfying the ele-
ments of a criminal offense are exculpated because their mental ill-
ness or defect precludes a finding of blameworthiness, rather than
because their insanity negates the wrongfulness or unlawfulness of
their act.129
It is important to differentiate between general defenses of the
sort discussed in the preceding paragraph and absent-element de-
fenses.130 While general defenses relieve a defendant of criminal lia-
124. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 1 (4th ed. 2006).
125. FRANcisco Mufioz CONDE & MERCEDES GARctA ARAN, DERECHO PENAL PARTE
GENERAL 252 (6th ed. 2004).
126. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 199, 203 (1982).
127. Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 751-52 (2008).
128. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02.
129. Luis E. Chiesa & George P. Fletcher, Self-Defense and the Psychotic Aggressor,
in CRIMINAL LAw CONVERSATIONS (Robinson, Ferzan & Garvey, eds., 2009).
130. General defenses can also be distinguished from so-called offense modification
defenses. Whereas offense modification defenses alter the definition of an offense so as
to not include certain conduct within the scope of the prohibition, justification defenses
preclude punishment despite the fact that the conduct actually satisfies the elements of
the definition of the offense. See generally Robinson, supra note 126, at 213-14. An
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bility despite the fact that the defendant's conduct satisfied the
elements of the offense charged, absent-element defenses generate an
acquittal because they reveal that the defendant's conduct did not sat-
isfy the elements of the crime charged.x3 An example of an absent-
element defense is the victim's consent in rape. Given that the core
elements of the offense of rape are "engaging in nonconsensual sexual
intercourse with another person," proof of the victim's consent
amounts to a negation of an essential element of the offense charged
(the nonconsensual nature of the intercourse) rather than to a claim of
justification or excuse.132
A formalistic approach to defining criminal offenses also requires
distinguishing between elements of an offense strictu sensu and fac-
tors aggravating or mitigating the punishment imposed for engaging
in conduct satisfying the elements of the crime. If what counts as an
offense-element is to be determined solely by looking at the legisla-
ture's definition of the crime, it follows that the aggravating or miti-
gating factors that the legislature decided to list separately from the
definition of the crime should not be considered "core offense
elements."
Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether the legislature in-
tended a factor that impacts punishment to be an element of the of-
fense or an aggravating factor that ought to be taken into account only
after the court or jury concludes that the defendant's conduct satisfied
the elements of the crime. This typically happens when the legisla-
ture provides a definition of an offense and then immediately lists one
or more specific circumstances that aggravate the punishment for that
specific crime. The federal carjacking statute illustrates the problem:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported,
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by
intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-
(1) Be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury .. . results, be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
example of an offense modification defense is the "de minimis" infraction defense af-
forded pursuant to MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12.
131. PAUL H. ROBINsON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAw 69 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1997).
132. Kyron Huigens, Fletcher's Rethinking: A Memoir, 39 TuLsA L. REV. 803, 812-13
(2004).
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(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for
any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to
death. 133
There are at least two plausible readings of this statute. On the
one hand, some may argue that subsections (2) and (3) ought to be
combined with the preceding paragraph's definition of cariacking to
create the distinct and separate offenses of "taking a motor vehicle in
a manner that causes serious bodily injury" and "taking a motor vehi-
cle in a manner that causes the death of a human being." This sort of
reading of criminal statutes is not an unheard of method. The Califor-
nia murder statute,134 for example, defines murder as "the unlawful
killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought." 35 The Cali-
fornia statute then lists certain circumstances that would make the
killing a murder in the first degree. 36 Additionally, the California
murder statute prescribes that "all other kinds of murder are of the
second degree." 37 Although some may argue that there is only one
offense of murder and that the list of circumstances that serve to dis-
tinguish first degree murder from second degree murder ought to be
considered mere aggravating or mitigating sentencing factors, others
may argue that this type of statute creates two separate and distinct
offenses of "murder in the first degree" and "murder in the second de-
gree." 38 Similarly, some may argue that the federal carjacking stat-
ute creates a single offense of "[unlawfully] taking a motor vehicle"
and that the factors listed in subsections (2) and (3) merely constitute
sentencing factors that impact punishment without altering the core
offense elements of the crime.
In Jones v. United States,'3 9 however, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the aforementioned statute contained several
distinct offenses, rather than one generic carjacking offense, with sev-
eral aggravating sentencing factors. Although a close examination of
the Jones decision is outside the purview of this Article, it is notewor-
thy that the sort of question presented in the case cannot be conclu-
sively answered by invoking a formalistic test as a tool to determine
what counts as an "element of the offense." In light of the way in
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996).
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1996).
135. Id.
136. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1996).
137. Id.
138. In Burttram v. State, for example, the Florida court held that the factor that
serves to differentiate between first and second degree murder-premeditation-ought
to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. 780 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001). The implication of this view is that first and second degree murder may be
conceived as two different offenses, at least for the purposes of Winship's beyond a rea-
sonable doubt rule.
139. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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which the federal carjacking statute was drafted, it is unclear whether
subsections (2) and (3) were meant to be read as listing mere sentenc-
ing factors or as creating distinct offenses. Thus, the issue could only
be settled by looking at factors that transcend the statutory definition
of the offense.
In contrast, some statutes provide a laundry list of sentencing fac-
tors that aggravate or mitigate the punishment to be imposed for any
offense rather than for one particular crime. In North Carolina, for
example, the criminal code contains a section titled "Aggravated and
mitigated sentences" that lists twenty-six aggravating factors and
twenty-one mitigating factors. 140 Thus, rather than including these
aggravating and mitigating elements after the definition of each of-
fense, the North Carolina General Assembly opted for including all of
them in a separate provision related to sentencing. A formalistic ap-
proach to defining criminal offenses provides an obvious answer to
whether this type of laundry list of aggravating circumstances should
be considered sentencing factors or elements of an offense. Given that
the legislature expressly decided to define the specific offenses without
including the aggravating factors following the definition of the base
offense, it can be surmised that they should be treated as sentencing
factors rather than elements of the offense.
2. The Compatibility of the "Formalistic Approach" with Supreme
Court Jurisprudence
The formalistic approach to defining criminal offenses can explain
several of the Supreme Court of the United States' "burden of proof"
cases. In Patterson v. New York, 14 1 for example, the Supreme Court
looked to New York's statutory definition of murder in order to deter-
mine whether "extreme emotional disturbance" ("EED") negated an el-
ement of the offense of murder or established a defense that partially
excused conduct without negating the elements of the offense charged.
After concluding that no reference was made to the presence or ab-
sence of EED in the statutory definition of the crime, the Court con-
tended that EED should be considered a defense rather than an
element of the offense. Similarly, the Supreme Court concluded in
Dixon v. United States1 42 that the absence of duress was not an ele-
ment of the offense of certain firearm violations because the United
States Congress did not define the crimes charged in a way that sug-
gested that proof of duress would negate an element of the offense.143
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16 (2009).
141. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
142. 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
143. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
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The formalistic approach is, however, incompatible with most, if
not all, of the Supreme Court's "beyond a reasonable doubt" sentenc-
ing factor jurisprudence. As discussed in Part II of this Article, the
Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey'4 that a legislature's decision
to label an element a "sentencing factor" does not necessarily entail
that it will be treated as such for the purposes of triggering In re Win-
ship145 protections. 146 The rule put forth in Apprendi has been subse-
quently upheld in at least five occasions. 147 Consequently, the
Supreme Court's post-Apprendi jurisprudence has focused on sub-
stance rather than form when determining whether a factor impacting
a defendant's punishment should be treated as an element of the of-
fense triggering Winship protections or as a sentencing factor that
does not.
As a result, regardless of its merits and demerits,148 the formalis-
tic approach to defining criminal offenses cannot be considered the
cornerstone of the Supreme Court's approach to the offense/defense
distinction simply because it is at odds with numerous of the Court's
precedents.
B. AN OFFENSE AS A BASIc WRONG
1. The Approach
Some have claimed that in order to adequately define what counts
as a criminal offense, it is best to go beyond the statutory definition of
the crime. According to this approach, conduct satisfying the ele-
ments of the offense is relevant to the criminal law in a way that con-
duct not satisfying the elements of the offense is not. Conduct
amounting to an offense is legally relevant because there is something
prima facie wrong with engaging in such acts. Furthermore, given
that such conduct is objectionable, we have good legal reasons for not
engaging in the act.149
Such approaches to defining criminal offenses have commanded
support from some of the most sophisticated criminal theorists of our
time. George Fletcher, for example, defended a similar approach in his
144. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
145. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
146. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
147. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.
270 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
148. The author has argued elsewhere that there are powerful reasons in favor of
rejecting the formalistic approach to defining criminal offenses. See Why is it a Crime,
supra note 23.
149. See Luis E. Chiesa, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons Theory of
Wrongdoing, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 102 (2007) [hereinafter Normative Gaps].
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much celebrated Rethinking Criminal Law.150 There, Fletcher de-
fined a criminal offense as "the minimal set of elements necessary to
incriminate the actor." More specifically, Fletcher contended that:
We may explicate . .. the definition of an offense as the viola-
tion of a prohibitory norm. Features of this violation are,
first, that the violating conduct incriminates the actor in a
given society at a given time; and further, that the violation is
typically sufficient to regard the act as wrongful and to hold
the violator personally accountable for his wrongdoing.' 5 '
Thus, according to Fletcher, conduct amounts to an offense only
when engaging in such conduct both incriminates the actor and typi-
cally152 entails a finding of wrongfulness. With regard to the incrimi-
natory nature of an offense, it is important to note that the "minimal
set of elements necessary to incriminate the actor" need not necessa-
rily coincide with the legislative definition of an offense.
Take, for example, the statutory definition of murder put forth in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). Article 118 of the
UCMJ prescribes that a person is guilty of murder if a person inten-
tionally and "without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human
being."' 53 This definition surely includes more elements than are nec-
essary to incriminate the actor, for the killing of a human being in-
criminates the actor regardless of whether it turns out to be justified or
excused. In other words, even if later justified or excused, the killing
of a human being is relevant for the criminal law. After all, as the
German criminal theorist Hans Welzel stated over fifty years ago, it is
not the same thing to kill a mosquito than to kill a human being in
self-defense.154 A killing in self-defense is relevant for the criminal
law in at least two ways in which killing a mosquito is not. First,
there are always good reasons for abstaining from killing a human
being, even if the human being is an aggressor. The life of every
human being, including aggressors, is of significant value to society.
150. See FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 562.
151. FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 562.
152. Conduct that satisfies the elements of a criminal offense is usually wrongful.
Such conduct might, however, turn out not to be wrongful in atypical cases, such as
when an offense is committed pursuant to justifiable self-defense or law enforcement
authority. This is why Fletcher states that the infraction of the elements of the offense
is typically wrongful. The choice of the term "typically" is thus both intentional and
important, for conduct that amounts to an offense it typically, though not necessarily,
wrongful. The importance of this feature of the offense is so paramount that the term
coined by Spanish criminal theorists to refer to the offense-"tipo"-is the Spanish word
for "typical". See generally SArrIAco MIR PUIG, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 222
(7th ed. 2004).
153. 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2007).
154. HANs WELZEL, DERECHO PENAL ALEMAN 97-98 (Juan Bustos Ramirez & Sergio
YAfiez Pdrez trans., 4th ed. 1997).
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Ultimately, even if the value of the assailant's life is discounted as a
result of his status as an aggressor, 155 the aggressor's life remains
more valuable to society than the life of the mosquito. The second
point is related to the first. Given that taking the aggressor's life is
valuable, good reasons exist for society to regret that the aggressor's
life had to be terminated in order to thwart the unlawful attack. Al-
though killing the aggressor ought to be considered lawful, it would
have been better yet to have thwarted the attack without killing him.
This explains why a duty to retreat still exists in many jurisdictions as
a prerequisite for the use of deadly force. 156 Since the life of the ag-
gressor remains valuable in spite of his wrongful conduct, society
often prefers that the attack be averted by retreating rather than by
killing the aggressor. Obviously, no such duty to retreat exists before
one is about to kill a mosquito. Given that killing a mosquito is not an
act that society believes there is reason to regret, there is no duty to
explore available alternatives before deciding to terminate the insect's
life.157
Hopefully this discussion helps to explain why the UCMJ's defini-
tion of murder contains more elements than are necessary to incrimi-
nate the actor. Technically, justified killings do not satisfy the
UCMJ's definition of the offense of murder. Thus, from a formalistic
viewpoint, such justifiable killings would not even amount to an of-
fense under the UCMJ. A more substantive approach like the one put
forth at the beginning of this section would lead to a different result.
Since any killing, regardless of its justifiable or excusable nature
(think of the killing of the aggressor discussed in the previous para-
graph), inculpates the actor and is relevant for the criminal law, it
follows that the definition of the offense of murder is "the killing of a
human being." Questions ofjustification and excuse are thus excluded
from the definition of the offense. They are questions pertaining to
the exculpatory dimension of wrongfulness, that is, to the theory of
criminal defenses rather than to the theory of criminal offenses.
155. For a discussion of the way in which the aggressor's wrongful attack gives rise
to a right of self-defense, see Luis E. Chiesa & George P. Fletcher, Self-Defense and the
Psychotic Aggressor, in CRImiNAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Robinson, Ferzan & Garvey,
eds., 2009).
156. King v. State, 171 So. 254 (Ala. 1936); Sydnor v. State, 776 A.2d 669 (Md.
2001); State v. Austin, 332 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1983).
157. This assumes, of course, that killing a mosquito does not run afoul anti-cruelty
statutes. This seems to be the case, given that anti-cruelty laws typically exclude insects
from the class of animals that are protected by statute. A representative statute is Ari-
zona's prohibition of animal cruelty, which defines "animal" as "a mammal, bird, reptile
or amphibian". See Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2910(H)(1) (2010).
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John Gardner has recently defended a similar approach to defin-
ing criminal offenses. Following Kenneth Campbell,15 Gardner sug-
gests that the distinction between offenses and (justification) defenses
lays in the difference between reasons in favor and reasons against
engaging in conduct.' 59 This leads Gardner to posit that an offense
provides us with reasons against engaging in certain acts. Justifica-
tion defenses, in contrast, provide us with reasons in favor of engaging
in conduct satisfying the elements of the offense.' 60 Thus, the offense
of homicide provides us with reasons against taking human life. On
the other hand, the rules allowing for the justifiable use of deadly
force in self-defense provide us with reasons in favor of engaging in
conduct that admittedly satisfied the elements of the offense of homi-
cide. Consequently, this approach leads to the conclusion that conduct
is justified when the reasons in favor of engaging in the act (for exam-
ple, saving the life of the innocent victim) prevail over the reasons
against doing so.161
A consequence of Gardner's approach is that the reasons that
make engaging in certain conduct an offense do not disappear merely
because the conduct is justified. Although justifications provide an ac-
tor with reasons for engaging in the conduct that outweigh the rea-
sons against performing the act, "the offence is still committed and is
still, qua offence, unwelcome."162 As a result, "its commission, albeit
justified, remains regrettable."163 This leads Gardner to conclude
that, "it would have been better still had there been no occasion to
commit [the offense], and hence no need to ask whether its commis-
sion was justified or not."164
Thus, the reasons that make the conduct an offense seemingly ex-
ert a rational pull against engaging in the conduct even in cases of
justification. Therefore, it would be perfectly rational for an actor to
cite the prohibition against killing human beings (for example, the ex-
istence of the offense of homicide) as a reason to abstain from using
deadly force against another in self-defense even if the law would have
allowed him to use such force.
An important implication of Gardner's theory of criminal offenses
is that the determination of whether conduct amounts to an offense or
not need not necessarily coincide with the statutorily prescribed defi-
158. Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS
FROM the W.G. Hart Workshop 73 (I.H. Dennis, ed., 1987).
159. Gardner, supra note 23, at 819.
160. Id.
161. Normative Gaps, supra note 149, at 137.
162. Gardner, supra note 23, at 820.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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nition of the offense. Therefore, under Gardner's approach, like
Fletcher's, substance trumps form. Examining the exculpatory role of
consent in battery illustrates this point. The victim's consent is some-
times a defense to battery.165 But is consent a true defense to battery
in the sense that it justifies conduct that admittedly satisfies the ele-
ments of the offense of battery, or is consent in such cases a way of
negating the elements of the offense charged? Statutory definitions
sometimes do not help to answer this question. In California, for ex-
ample, battery is defined as "any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence against the person."166 Arguably, the victim's consent ne-
gates the "unlawful" nature of the force used against the victim. If so,
consent would negate an element of the offense according to the statu-
tory definition of the crime. This reading finds much support in the
law of torts, given that a tortious battery is often defined as the "ac-
tual infliction of UNCONSENTED injury upon or UNCONSENTED contact
with another."167 Should it then be concluded that consent in battery
cases negates an element of the offense?
Gardner would probably argue that it should not. Ultimately, dis-
entangling the offense/defense distinction requires one to go beyond
statutory formulations of an offense. In the case of battery, for exam-
ple, one should ask whether there is a general reason for people not to
use force or violence against others. 68 If there is a general reason to
abstain from employing force or violence against the person of an-
other-and there certainly seems to be-then the offense of battery
should be defined without making reference to the victim's consent. 69
The offense of battery thus gives people good reasons for abstaining to
use force or violence against others regardless of the consensual nature
of the conduct. Consent, however, might in some cases provide the
actor with reasons in favor of using force or violence that prevail over
the reasons against doing so. Therefore, despite statutory appear-
ances to the contrary, Gardner would likely claim that consent is a
justification defense to battery rather than a negation of an element of
the offense.
In sum, the substantive approach to defining criminal offenses ad-
vocated by Fletcher and Gardner leads to defining an offense as the
most basic and stripped down description of an act that we have a
general reason to abstain from performing. Any additional element
that impacts our assessment of the actor's responsibility (for example,
consent in battery cases or self-defense in homicide cases) is therefore
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (2009).
166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 2009).
167. Yoder v. Cotton, 758 N.W. 2d 630, 635 (Neb. 2008) (emphasis added).
168. Gardner, supra note 23, at 820.
169. Id.
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relevant to determining the actor's fault or blameworthiness for hav-
ing engaged in the conduct but not to negating the commission of the
offense. 170
2. The Compatibility of the "Basic Wrong" Approach to Defining
Criminal Offenses with Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Although many compelling arguments in favor of adopting the
"basic wrong" approach to defining criminal offenses1 71 exist, the com-
patibility of this approach with Supreme Court of the United States
jurisprudence regarding the offense/defense distinction is not one of
them. As has been discussed earlier, the Supreme Court's pre-Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey172 "beyond a reasonable doubt" cases adopted
(with the possible exception of Mullaney v. Wilbur173 ) a formalistic
approach to the offense/defense distinction. Such formalistic ap-
proaches cannot be squared with the substantive inquiry that under-
girds the "basic wrong" approach to the distinction.
The "basic wrong" approach is also incompatible with post-Ap-
prendi case law. Even though in these cases the Supreme Court
seemed to adopt a more substantive approach to determining what
amounts to an element of the offense, its conclusion that certain fac-
tors that aggravate punishment ought to be considered de facto ele-
ments of the offense for In re Winshipl 74 purposes cannot be justified
under the "basic wrong" approach to the offense/defense distinction.
By definition, factors that aggravate punishment increase the actor's
fault or blameworthiness for having engaged in conduct amounting to
an offense, regardless of whether the aggravating factor is present.
Therefore, such aggravating factors cannot be said to qualify the basic
or stripped down wrong committed by the actor.
These aggravating factors do not, in other words, count as ele-
ments of the offense because they in no way help establish the "mini-
mal set of elements necessary to incriminate the actor."' 75
C. THE "NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE" APPROACH TO
DEFINING OFFENSES
1. The Approach
Perhaps the most intuitively appealing way of defining a criminal
offense is as an act that is not permitted by the criminal law. Some
170. Id. at 824-27.
171. See Why is it a Crime, supra note 23.
172. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
173. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
174. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
175. FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 562.
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may contend that conduct is not permitted by law when there is a law
prohibiting the conduct. At first glance, this proposition would seem
unassailable. After all, if the criminal law prohibits X-ing, it should
follow that X-ing is not permitted by the criminal law. Nevertheless,
upon closer inspection, it turns out that there is a sense in which X-ing
might be permitted by the criminal law even though there is a law
that prohibits X-ing. This seemingly contradictory state of affairs
stems from the fact that, in addition to prohibitory norms, the crimi-
nal law also contains permissive norms.
Therefore, there are some contexts in which it is not contradictory
to state that the criminal law seems to both prohibit and permit X-ing.
This is exactly what happens when there is a conflict between a pro-
hibitory norm requiring an actor to abstain from engaging in certain
conduct (do not cause bodily harm to another person!) and a permis-
sive norm allowing the actor to engage in said conduct (you may cause
bodily harm in self-defense!).
Scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have devoted considerable
efforts to describing the state of affairs that arises when prohibitory
and permissive norms are in conflict with one another. In America,
for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued that there is a differ-
ence between conduct that is lawful because it does not contravene a
prohibitory norm, and conduct that is lawful because a permissive
norm exists allowing the actor to contravene the prohibitory norm.176
Thomson believes that in the former case (no contravention of the pro-
hibitory norm) there is no infringement of legal rules.177 However,
she believes that in the latter case (contravention of prohibitory norm
authorized by a permissive norm) there is an infringement of a legal
rule, but there is no violation of the rules.178
The following table summarizes Thomson's views:
176. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, 19 Aiz. L. REV. 45, 50
(1977).
177. Thomson, supra note 176, at 50.
178. Id.
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Contravention of Concurrence of Example Infringement Violation
Prohibitory Norm Permissive Norm
Authorizing the
Conduct
No No Killing a fly No No
Yes Yes Killing a human Yes No
being in self-
defense
Yes No Killing a human Yes Yes
being without
justification
Others, like George Fletcher, have proposed that we distinguish
between conduct that is prima facie (all things being equal) wrongful
and conduct that is wrongful all things being considered.'79 Conduct
is prima facie wrongful when it contravenes a prohibitory norm.' 80
Under this schema, the killing of a human being is prima facie wrong-
ful because it runs afoul the prohibitory norm that requires people to
abstain from committing homicide. It should be noted, however, that
conduct that is prima facie wrongful can nevertheless be not wrongful
when all things are considered.18 Thus, a police officer who kills a
dangerous fleeing felon posing a risk to the life or limb of third parties
has engaged in conduct that is prima facie wrongful because the kill-
ing contravenes the prohibitory norm embodied in the crime of homi-
cide. Nonetheless, the killing of the felon is not wrongful all things
considered because a permissive norm authorizes the killing of fleeing
felons by police officers when doing so is necessary to protect their
lives or the lives of third parties.
Thomson's distinction between rule infringements and rule viola-
tions, and Fletcher's distinction between prima facie and all things
being considered wrongfulness, leads to distinguishing between differ-
ent types of lawful conduct. For Thomson, conduct that justifiably
contravenes the offense (for example, taking a small amount of money
from a box without the owner's consent in order to save a child's life) is
not as innocuous as conduct that does not amount to an offense in the
first place (for example, taking the money from the box with the
owner's consent).182 Similarly, Fletcher has argued that "there is still
something untoward, something not quite right" when someone justi-
fiably contravenes an offense (for example, kills in self-defense),
179. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAw 80 (1998).
180. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 562.
181. FLETCHER, supra note 179, at 80.
182. Thomson, supra note 176.
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whereas there is nothing wrong at all with conduct that does not con-
travene an offense (for example, killing a fly).1 83
For others, the distinction between "infringements" and "viola-
tions" and between "prima facie" and "all things being considered"
wrongfulness is logically plausible yet substantively unilluminating.
For them, conduct authorized pursuant to a permissive norm does not
amount to an offense even if it nominally seems to contravene a prohib-
itory norm.184 According to this view, a criminal offense consists of
both positive and negative elements. The elements making up the pro-
hibitory norm comprise the positive facet of the offense. 85 On the
other hand, the negative dimension of the offense consists in the ab-
sence of a permissive norm authorizing the actor to contravene the
prohibitory norm.186 So conceived, an offense would amount to con-
duct that satisfies the elements of the prohibition (positive facet of the
offense) and that is not authorized pursuant to a justification defense
such as self-defense, choice of the lesser evil, or law enforcement au-
thority (negative dimension of the offense).' 87
Continental scholars have dubbed this approach to defining of-
fenses as the "negative elements of the offense" theory.'88 One of
Spain's leading criminal theorists-Diego Manuel Luz6n Pefa-is one
of the most vocal defenders of this conception of criminal offenses.
Luz6n Pefa explains the theory in the following manner:
There is an offense only when [the actor's conduct] is without
justification. This conception of the offense . .. is comprised of
two parts: the positive component of the offense (i.e. the of-
fense strictu sensu), which contains the elements .. . of crimes
listed in the special part [of a criminal code] . . . and a nega-
tive component, which amounts to the absence of justification
defenses.' 89
It should be noted that Luz6n Pefta acknowledges that statutory defi-
nitions of crimes do not typically include the absence of justification as
an element of the offense.' 90 He believes, however, that this has more
183. FLETCHER, supra note 179, at 81.
184. See generally EUGENIO RAtL ZAFFARONI, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 385
(2d ed. 2002).
185. 2 JuAN J. BusTos RAMIREZ & HERNAN HORMAZABAL MALARgE, LECCIONES DE
DERECHO PENAL 19 (1999).
186. Id.
187. CLAus RoXIN, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 283-84 (Luz6n Pefla, Dfaz y
Garcia Conlledo & de Vicente Remesal trans., 1997).
188. FRANCIsCO MUf4OZ CONDE & MERCEDES GARIcA AaAN, DERECHO PENAL PARTE
GENERAL 252, 253 (6th ed. 2004).
189. 1 DIEGO MANUEL LUZON PERA, CURSO DE DERECHO PENAL 299 (Universitas,
1996).
190. PERA, supra note 189 (stating that the absence of justification is usually not
"expressly" designated by the legislature as an element of criminal offenses).
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to do with the legislature's desire to avoid repetitiveness and keep the
text of criminal statutes as short and uncomplicated as possible. More
specifically, Luz6n Pefia contends that:
[The] negative component of the offense .. . is generally [ar-
ticulated] tacitly, for it is superimposed on the precepts of the
special part for reasons of legislative economy so as to avoid
constantly repeating that the general prohibition of X or Y
conduct is punishable unless a justification defense is present
[in the given case]. [T]his is why justification defenses are
prescribed in a generic fashion in the general part [of crimi-
nal codes].' 9 '
The so-called "negative elements of the offense" theory is by no
means a European concoction. Several prominent Anglo-American
scholars defend a similar approach to defining criminal offenses.1 92
Kyron Huigens represents a salient example. Although Huigens does
not expressly call justifications "negative elements of the offense," his
writings on the subject suggest that this is exactly what he believes.
In language mirroring Luz6n Pefia's ruminations on the subject,
Huigens has contended that "justification is as much a part of the pro-
hibition as the offense definition"'93 and that "a justification is not
independent of the prohibitory norms expressed in offense defini-
tions."194 Huigens believes that this is the case because:
Offense definitions are necessarily incomplete in many in-
stances, and the justification defense is the rest of the story,
so to speak, about the prohibition. It is not wrong to pur-
posely kill a human being; it is wrong to purposely kill a
human being without a sufficiently good reason to do so. It is
in the nature of a justification ... to show us that an appar-
ent wrong is not a wrong at all, but a right action. We might
express the entire prohibition in the offense definition, but for
a particular practical concern: it is impossible to prove a neg-
ative unless it is very narrowly framed.' 95
As one can readily see, the theory of the "negative elements of the
offense" provides an approach to defining criminal offenses that con-
trasts both with the formalistic approach discussed in Part III(A) and
the "basic wrong" approach discussed in the Part III(B). Under the
formalistic approach, a criminal offense consists of conduct that satis-
fies the statutorily prescribed definition of an offense. This usually
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIM-
INAL LAw 31-33, 64-67 (1997).
193. Kyron Huigens, Fletcher's Rethinking: A Memoir, 39 TULSA L. REv. 803, 811(2004).
194. Huigens, supra note 193, at 811.
195. Id.
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precludes considering justifications as elements of the offense, given
that the legislature typically fails to include the absence of justifica-
tory circumstances as part of the definition of crimes. Under the "ba-
sic wrong" approach, a criminal offense consists of the "minimal set of
elements necessary to incriminate the actor." This approach also pre-
cludes considering justifications as elements of the offense, since con-
duct that contravenes the prohibitory norm incriminates the actor
even if it turns out to be justified.
In contrast, justification plays a central role in the negative ele-
ments of the offense theory. This theory holds that an offense consists
of both positive and negative elements. That is, an offense entails not
only the contravention of a prohibitory norm (do not kill!), but also the
absence of a justification defense that allows the actor to contravene
the prohibitory norm (you may kill in self-defense!).
2. The Compatibility of the "Negative Elements of the Offense"
Approach to Defining Criminal Offenses with Supreme
Court Jurisprudence
Despite its intuitive appeal, the "negative elements of the offense"
approach to determining what counts as an element of the offense is in
tension with the Supreme Court of the United States' "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" jurisprudence. In Martin v. Ohio,196 for example, the
Court had to decide whether the prosecution had the burden of dis-
proving the justification of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court answered the question in the negative, holding that self-
defense "sought to justify [defendant's] actions" without negating the
elements of the offense charged.197 Although the Court did not di-
rectly address the theoretical issues discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, its express refusal in Martin to treat the absence of justification
as an element of the offense may be construed as a tacit rejection of
the negative elements of the offense theory.
D. THE "COMPREHENSIVE" APPROACH To DEFINING CRIMINAL
OFFENSES
1. The Approach
The broadest way of defining an offense would be by combining all
elements that must be proven in order for defendant's conduct to be
punishable. An actor may be punished only if it is proven that he en-
gaged in conduct that satisfies the elements of the offense unjustifi-
196. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
197. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 231 (1987).
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ably and inexcusably.198 Thus, the broadest approach to defining
criminal offenses would include not only the infraction of the prohibi-
tory norm as an element of the crime, but also the absence of justifica-
tion and excuse, given that the concurrence of such defenses precludes
the imposition of punishment.' 99 Furthermore, the absence of so-
called "non-exculpatory" defenses ought also be considered an element
of the offense, since the presence of such defenses also generates an
acquittal.200
This way of defining crimes has been dubbed by some as the "com-
prehensive" or "complete" approach to identifying elements of the of-
fense. Such a comprehensive approach:
[SIuppress[es] the distinction between the ordinary and the
extraordinary. [It] state [s] all the criteria that are relevant to
the solution of any [criminal] case that might arise. To
move ... to a comprehensive [approach], we need an exhaus-
tive catalogue of possible defenses. The absence of each of
these possible defenses must then be stated as an element of
the comprehensive rule. A comprehensive rule of criminal
homicide would begin like this: You are liable for murder if
(1) you act (2) intentionally (3) to bring about the death of (4)
a living human being, and you are not acting in (5) self-de-
fense or while (6) insane.201
The comprehensive approach to defining criminal offenses has
commanded some support amongst criminal law theorists, at least in
the context of determining what counts as an "offense" for the pur-
poses of the prosecution's burden of proof.202 The drafters of the Model
Penal Code ("MPC"), for example, found the approach sufficiently ap-
pealing to base their definition of an offense upon this model. As a
result, an "element of the offense" is defined in section 1.13(9) of the
MPC as an element that (1) is included in the description of the forbid-
den conduct in the definition of the offense,203 (2) establishes the re-
quired form of culpability, 204 (3) negates an excuse or justification for
such conduct, 205 (4) negates a defense under the statute of limita-
198. MARKus DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAw: MODEL PENAL CODE 28-31 (Foundation Press
2002).
199. DUBBER, supra note 198.
200. Non-exculpatory defenses preclude punishment even though they do not ne-
gate wrongful nature of the conduct or the defendant's fault or blameworthiness. Exam-
ples of non-exculpatory defenses include the statute of limitations, diplomatic immunity
and, more controversially, entrapment. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law
Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 229-31 (1982).
201. FLETCHER, supra note 179, at 97.
202. Id. at 100.
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)(a) (2002).
204. § 1.13(9)(b).
205. § 1.13(9)(c).
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tions, 206 or (5) establishes jurisdiction or venue.207 It is difficult to
fathom a more comprehensive articulation of what counts as an ele-
ment of an offense than this one.208
2. The Compatibility of the "Comprehensive" Approach to Defining
Criminal Offenses with Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Of the four approaches to defining criminal offenses discussed in
this Part of the Article, the "comprehensive" approach is perhaps the
most incompatible with Supreme Court of the United States jurispru-
dence. While the Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur209 to consider
the absence of provocation as an element of the offense seemed to sug-
gest that the Court was willing to adopt a more comprehensive ap-
proach to defining an offense,210 the Court's subsequent case law
belies this contention. Ever since Patterson v. New York 211 was de-
cided more than thirty years ago, the Court has repeatedly held that
the elements of an offense do not include the absence of justification
(Martin v. Ohio212) or excuse (Patterson, Dixon v. U.S. 213). This, of
course, amounts to an implicit rejection of the comprehensive account
of criminal offenses.
E. SUMMARY: THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH To DEFINING
CRIMINAL OFFENSES IS INCOHERENT
Since the Supreme Court of the United States held in In re Win-
ship214 that the government had the burden of proving the elements of
the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court has strug-
gled to come to grips with the offense/defense/sentencing factor tris-
tinction. The Court's haphazard approach to defining criminal
offenses can be broken down into three stages. During the first stage,
206. § 1.13(9)(d).
207. § 1.13(9)(e).
208. It should be noted, however, that the drafters of the MPC distinguished be-
tween "elements of the offense" and "material elements of the offense." Material ele-
ments of the offense encompass both the elements that are included in the definition of
the prohibitory norm and matters of justification and excuse. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.13(10) (2002). Thus, the MPC's approach to defining what counts as a "material
element of the offense" is comprehensive, given that it includes the absence of defenses
within the definition of the offense. It is, however, less comprehensive than the Code's
definition of what counts as an "element of the offense," since the definition of a "mate-
rial element of the offense" does not include "non-exculpatory" defenses such as the stat-
ute of limitations or the absence of jurisdiction.
209. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
210. FLETCHER, supra note 179, at 100.
211. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
212. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
213. 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
214. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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the Court flirted with adopting a substantive approach to defining
criminal offenses. Under this approach, whether a factor amounted to
an element of the offense mostly depended on the impact that the fac-
tor had on the defendant's punishment, rather than on whether such a
factor was included within the statutory definition of the crime. This
approach seemed to undergird some of the language put forth by the
majority in Mullaney v. Wilbur.215
The Court moved away from substantive approaches to defining
criminal offenses in its post-Mullaney v. Wilbur "beyond a reasonable
doubt" jurisprudence. 216 The distinguishing feature of this second
stage in the Court's attempt to flesh out the contours of the Winship
doctrine was the Court's reliance on the statutory definition of crimes
as the sole litmus test for determining what counts as an element of
the offense. This approach provided the Court with a coherent way of
explaining the offense/defense/sentencing factor tristinction. As Pat-
terson v. New York,217 Martin v. Ohio,218 and Leland v. Oregon,219
exemplified, a factor impacting a defendant's punishment counts as an
element of the offense rather than as a defense only if the legislature
either expressly or by tacit reference to the common law definition of the
crime included such a factor in the definition of the offense. Similarly,
as McMillan v. Pennsylvania220 illustrated, aggravating factors count
as an element of the offense for the purpose of triggering Winship's
"beyond a reasonable doubt" rule only if the legislature expressly in-
cluded them within the definition of the offense charged. If not, courts
should consider the aggravating factor as a mere sentencing factor
that does implicate Winship.
The third and current stage has two distinctive features. First, as
Apprendi v. New Jersey221 illustrates, the Court has chosen to adopt a
substantive approach to distinguishing between offense elements and
sentencing factors. Under this approach, whether a sentencing factor
ought to be treated as an element of the offense depends more on the
impact that the factor has on the defendant's punishment than on the
way in which the legislature has decided to label it. Second, as Dixon
v. United States222 reveals, the Court has continued to adopt Patter-
son's formalistic approach to differentiating between offenses and de-
fenses. Under this approach, legislative labels are often, if not always,
215. 421 U.S. 674 (1975).
216. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 674, 684 (1975).
217. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
218. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
219. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
220. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
221. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
222. 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
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determinative of whether the absence of a defense ought to be treated
as an element of an offense or not. There is no reason to accept such a
schizophrenic result, unless the Court can provide a convincing expla-
nation of why it is sensible to adopt a substantive account of what
amounts to a criminal offense in the sentencing factor context and a
formalistic account of what amounts to an offense in the offense/de-
fense context. Up to this point, the Court has provided none.
The aim of this Part was to develop four different approaches to
defining criminal offenses in order to make sense of the Supreme
Court's current method of defining criminal offenses for the purposes
of Winship. While divergent from each other, these four approaches at
least have the virtue of being internally consistent. That is, the for-
malistic approach consistently defines an offense by making reference
to the statutorily prescribed definition of the offense both in the sen-
tencing factor context and the offense/defense context. Similarly, the
"basic wrong" approach defines an offense as "the minimal set of ele-
ments necessary to incriminate the actor" both for the purposes of dis-
tinguishing offenses from defenses and offenses from sentencing
factors. The same is true of the "negative elements of the offense" and
the "comprehensive" approaches to defining offenses.
The same cannot be said of the Court's approach to the offense/
defense/sentencing factor tristinction. The Court is trying to have its
cake and eat it too by invoking two conflicting approaches to defining
an offense depending on whether it is trying to distinguish offenses
from defenses or offenses from sentencing factors. This move is illegit-
imate unless the Court does what it has not done to date-explain
what, if anything, is gained by the internally inconsistent and concep-
tually perplexing approach to defining criminal offenses that it has
chosen. Unless it does so, the Court should either (1) abandon the
post-Apprendi substantive approach to defining criminal offenses in
the sentencing factor context and adopt an entirely formalistic ap-
proach to defining criminal offenses or (2) abandon its formalistic at-
tempts to distinguish offenses from defenses and adopt an entirely
substantive approach to defining offenses in all contexts.
Although the latter option might require modifying some of the
Court's post-Winship case law, Part V will contend that this is exactly
what should be done. Before doing so, however, Part IV attempts to
explain what led the Supreme Court to adopt this schizophrenic ap-
proach to defining criminal offenses in the first place. This will help
explain why the solution that will be offered to the problem might not
require a significant overhaul of post-Winship case law as one might
be led to believe at first glance.
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IV. A POSSIBLE DIAGNOSIS FOR THE SUPREME COURTS
SCHIZOPHRENIA: CONFLATING THE DUE PROCESS
AND JURY TRIAL GUARANTEES
The Supreme Court of the United States' schizophrenic approach
to defining criminal offenses for the purposes of In re Winship223 is
difficult to explain. Although several plausible explanations can ac-
count for the adoption of this haphazard approach, this Part argues
that the Court's confusion in this context can be traced back to its
failure to rigorously distinguish between the protections conferred to
criminal defendants as a result of Winship's "beyond a reasonable
doubt" doctrine and the safeguards afforded to them as a result of the
Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.
More specifically, this Part contends that Apprendi v. New
Jersey224 and its progeny reveals that the Court seems to tacitly as-
sume an essential connection between the circumstances triggering
the right to a jury trial and those triggering due process Winship pro-
tections. The problem with this tacit assumption is that no necessary
connection exists between the conditions triggering the application of
these two constitutional safeguards. Both precedent and constitu-
tional practice suggest that the elements making up a "criminal prose-
cution" for Sixth Amendment purposes are broader than the elements
comprising an "offense" for the purposes of due process. Therefore, it is
perfectly coherent and sensible for the Court to hold that an aggravat-
ing factor should be found by a jury while simultaneously holding that
it can be found by a less demanding standard than "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt."
A. CONFLATION
The infelicitous conflation of the conditions triggering jury trial
protections under the Sixth Amendment and In re Winship225 protec-
tions under due process is apparent from the beginning of the majority
opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey.226 There, Justice John Paul Ste-
vens asserted that due process requires that the "the jury verdict [be]
based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt" and that the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard "is now accepted in common law jurisdictions
as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince
the trier of all the essential elements of guilt."2 2 7
223. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
224. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
225. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
226. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
227. 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000).
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These propositions are misleading, for it is well known that the
jury determination of guilt must not be based in its entirety upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Only the jury findings with regard to the
existence of the elements of the offense need to be proven by this ex-
acting standard. In contrast, as has been discussed at length in Part
I, the combined effect of Patterson v. New York, 228 Martin v. Ohio,229
Leland v. Oregon,230 and Dixon v. United StateS231 is that the jury
does not have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt about the
inexistence of certain elements clearly bearing on the defendant's
guilt, namely, justification and excuse defenses.
The reason for the disconnect between the scope of the jury trial
and due process guarantees is that the Sixth Amendment confers to
defendants a constitutional right to a jury trial "in all criminal prose-
cutions." 232 Therefore, the right to a jury trial extends to all aspects of
the trial. As a result, a defendant has a right to have a jury find not
only the facts demonstrating that he has committed the elements of
the offense charged, but also those that undergird any substantive de-
fense for which he has presented sufficient evidence during the course
of the prosecution.233 Given that the jury's ultimate task is determin-
ing the innocence or guilt of the defendant, and that a defendant can-
not be found guilty if he committed the elements of the offense
justifiably or excusably, the jury has the responsibility of both ascer-
taining whether the defendant has infringed elements of the offense
and, if so, whether the infraction ought to be justified or excused.
On the other hand, due process Winship protections currently re-
quire only that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
elements of the offense rather than every element of the criminal case
that the jury must find. Thus, the triggering conditions and scope of
the Sixth and Fifth Amendments differ significantly. Whereas the
constitutional right to a jury extends to all facts relevant to guilt, Win-
ship protection merely attaches to the facts necessary to establish the
elements of the offense. Therefore, bundling together these two con-
stitutional rights or suggesting that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
protections can shed light in some meaningful way on the scope of
what amounts to an element of the offense under Winship is confusing
at best and downright misleading at worst.
228. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
229. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
230. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
231. 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
232. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
233. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.1(a) (West
2004).
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The rest of the majority opinion in Apprendi is equally confusing.
Take, for example, Justice Stevens' assertion that "[a]ny possible dis-
tinction between an 'element' of a felony offense and a 'sentencing fac-
tor' was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury,
and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our
Nation's founding."234 There are two problems with this contention.
First, as Professor Mitchell has argued, it is unclear whether it is ac-
tually true that at the time of the Nation's founding there was no dis-
tinction between "offense elements" and "sentencing factors."235 It
seems that many jurisdictions did in fact distinguish between ele-
ments of an offense and sentencing elements, especially in murder
cases.236
Furthermore, even if one accepts the majority's contention that
there was no distinction between offense elements and sentencing fac-
tors at the time of the Nation's founding, it is difficult to see why this
has anything to do with whether at the time such factors had to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is well known that during the
Eighteenth Century, juries were not always instructed to convict de-
fendants only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as they were
sometimes instructed to acquit if they "had any doubts" or if they
"lacked moral certainty" about the defendant's guilt.237 The "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, and the rules that govern its application
in concrete cases, was not fleshed out in detail until the Nineteenth
Century.238 Even then, the "reasonable doubt" standard was inter-
twined with the vague concept of "moral certainty," and, particularly
in the realm of sentencing practices and affirmative defenses, its scope
of application was far from clear. 239 Therefore, contrary to what the
majority in Apprendi suggests, the fact that sentencing factors should
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be inferred from the fact
234. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).
235. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi's Domain, 2006 Sup. CT. REV. 297 (2006).
236. Id.
237. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1165, 1195 (2003).
238. Id.
239. Professor John Langbein, for example, has argued that the 17th and 18th cen-
tury "moral certainty" standard required the jury to be "persuaded" by the evidence,
rather than to be convinced to the point of "certainty" or beyond a reasonable doubt.
JOHN LANGBEIN, ToRTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 80 (1976). Others, like Sheppard,
disagree. See Sheppard, supra note 237, at 1173. Regardless of this debate, it can, at
the very least, be concluded that it is unclear whether at the time of the founding juries
were required to convict defendants only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Conse-
quently, if it is not clear whether prosecutors at the time had to prove the offense be-
yond a reasonable doubt, it is a fortiori unclear whether they had to prove aggravating
or mitigating factors in that manner.
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that during the founding era there seemed to be no distinction be-
tween "offense elements" and "sentencing factors."
Apprendi's progeny also reveals the Court's failure to come to
grips with the different scope of application of the Sixth Amendment
jury trial protection and Winship's "beyond a reasonable doubt" doc-
trine. In United States v. Booker,240 for example, the Court framed
the issue raised in the case by stating that "Itihe question presented
[here] is whether an application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment."241 This reveals that the Court's in-
terest in examining the Fifth Amendment, due process, and Winship
issues raised by the case are marginal at best.242 Furthermore, and
even more puzzling, is the fact that in Part IV of the opinion, the
Court concluded by asserting that since a violation of the Sixth
Amendment occurred, the defendant was entitled to have the sentenc-
ing factor at issue found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.243 This
conclusion is quite troubling, given that the Sixth Amendment is obvi-
ously irrelevant to determining whether the Constitution requires
that a factor be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It would seem that
the Booker Court forgot that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine
and the jury trial protections conferred as a result of the Sixth Amend-
ment are separate safeguards and that they differ in their scope.
B. THE UNDESIRABILITY OF THE CONFLATION
The Supreme Court of the United States' conflation of the jury
trial and In re Winship244 due process protections is infelicitous be-
cause these two rights pursue different purposes. The right to a jury
trial is intended to provide the people with a check against the arbi-
240. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
241. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
242. An interesting way of looking at whether the Court believes that Apprendi and
its progeny has more to do with ascertaining the scope of the jury trial right than with
determining the boundaries of Winship's "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine is by ex-
amining the number of times in post-Apprendi sentencing factor jurisprudence that the
Court cited to Winship or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Blakely,
for example, the Court never once cited or discussed Winship, the Fifth Amendment, or
the Due Process Clause. In contrast, the majority in Blakely cited the Sixth Amendment
eight times and discussed it at length during the course of the whole opinion. This pro-
vides indirect evidence that what the Court mostly cares about in the Apprendi line of
cases is about having juries find sentencing factors rather than having them do so be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The former seems to be the gist of these holdings, whereas the
latter seems to be an afterthought. The same pattern can be found in Booker v. Califor-
nia, where the Court again failed to cite the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause, although the right to have the government prove a fact beyond a reasonable
doubt clearly stems from these constitutional provisions. Winship was cited only once.
Contrarily, the Court cited the Sixth Amendment twelve times!
243. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44.
244. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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trary enforcement of criminal lawS245 and a mechanism to prevent
punishing defendants for conduct that is not wrongful according to so-
cietal standards of morality.246 The right to have the prosecution
prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, on the
other hand, seeks to level the playing field between the government
and the defense 247 and to protect the defendant against the risks of an
unwarranted conviction.248 Given their different purposes, the right
to a jury trial and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine differ in
their nature.
The Sixth Amendment's jury trial is a rule that should apply
equally to every aspect of the criminal trial that may have an impact
on the defendant's guilt. Contrarily, the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
doctrine works as a rule that may, in principle, apply differently to
different aspects of the criminal case in order to strike the proper bal-
ance between the risk of an innocent person being convicted and the
risk of a guilty person going free.
Thus, while it may be sensible to conclude that if the prosecution
has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's con-
duct satisfied the definition of the offense charged, the jury must ac-
quit, it may also be sensible to contend that once the prosecution has
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has infringed
the elements of the offense, the jury is entitled to convict unless the
defendant can prove the existence of exculpating factors. This is the
way in which the Court currently strikes the balance between the
risks of unjust convictions and improper acquittals. While one may
disagree with the way in which the Court has decided to strike this
balance, it is difficult to understand how the jury trial right sheds
light on this difficult problem. If the Court's sentencing factor juris-
prudence is any indication, it would seem that looking to the Sixth
Amendment in order to clarify the scope of the due process beyond a
reasonable doubt rule serves to obfuscate these issues rather than il-
luminate them.
245. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 US 522, 530 (1975) (holding that "[tihe purpose of a
jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power").
246. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 58-59
(2003) (stating that the purpose of the jury is "to inject the common-sense views of the
community into a criminal proceeding to ensure that an individual would not lose her
liberty if it would be contrary to the community's sense of fundamental law and
equity").
247. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 196 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2003).
See also LARRY LAuDAN, TRUTH ERROR AND CRIMINAL LAw: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTE-
MOLOGY 145 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).
248. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
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V. THE "UNLAWFUL ACT" APPROACH TO THE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT DOCTRINE
By this point, the Author hopes to have demonstrated that the
Supreme Court of the United States' approach to defining criminal of-
fenses for the purposes of In re Winship'S249 beyond a reasonable
doubt rule is plagued by a fundamental contradiction. Despite efforts
to unravel the offense/defense/sentencing factor tristinction, the Court
has failed to put forth a coherent and internally consistent definition
of offense elements. For reasons that the Court has not fully ex-
plained, it has adopted a formalistic account of offense elements when
attempting to distinguish between offenses and defenses while simul-
taneously adopting a substantive account of offense elements when
distinguishing between offense elements and sentencing factors. This
schizophrenic approach to defining criminal offenses should be re-
jected unless there is a compelling justification for its adoption. So
far, no convincing reason has been put forth in favor of accepting this
convoluted account of the offense/defense/sentencing factor tristinc-
tion. Furthermore, as Part IV illustrates, the Court's lackadaisical at-
tempt to justify its approach to the Winship rule by linking the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine to the Sixth Amendment is un-
persuasive. A fresh start is clearly needed.
A. REJECTION OF THE FORMALISTIC APPROACH TO DEFINING
CRIMINAL OFFENSES
The two basic approaches to defining criminal offenses are the for-
malistic and the substantive approaches. The formalistic approach
holds that the elements of an offense ought to be ascertained solely by
looking at the elements that the legislature decided to include in the
statutory definition of the offense. 250 In contrast, substantive ap-
proaches hold that offense elements ought to be identified by making
reference to considerations that transcend the statutory definition of
the offense. 251 Both approaches find some support in the Supreme
Court of the United States' "beyond a reasonable doubt" jurispru-
dence. 252 It seems, however, that powerful reasons militate in sup-
port of favoring a substantive approach to defining offense elements
over a formalistic approach.
249. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
250. See supra Part III(A).
251. See supra Part III(B-D).
252. As was argued in detail in Parts I & II, supra notes 29-122, the Supreme Court
seems to have adopted a formalistic approach to defining criminal offenses in Patterson
v. New York and its progeny, whereas it appears to have adopted a substantive ap-
proach to the problem in Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny.
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The main objection that can be leveled against formalistic ap-
proaches to defining criminal offenses is that it abdicates control over
the scope of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine to the legisla-
ture. Given that under the formalistic approach the legislature's defi-
nition of the elements of the offense is considered controlling,
application of the In re Winship253 rule could easily be circumvented
by statutorily redefining the elements of the offense. This, as the
Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur254 and Apprendi v. New Jersey,255
and as the dissenters decried in Patterson v. New York, 256 is
unpalatable.
Furthermore, defining criminal offenses in accordance with the
whims of the legislature contributes to obfuscating the communicative
meaning of the different types of acts that are relevant for the crimi-
nal law. One should not lose sight of the fact that the offense/defense/
sentencing factor tristinction reveals something not only about the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine, but also about the nature of our
practices of blaming and punishing. A person's contravention of the
elements of the offense provides us with a prima facie reason to pun-
ish the person.257 The concurrence of defenses of justification or ex-
cuse, on the other hand, provides us with reasons to forego
punishment. 258 Finally, the presence of aggravating or mitigating
sentencing factors provides us with reasons for gradating punishment
in a way that more accurately reflects the culpability of the defendant.
These critical insights are lost if one adopts a formalistic definition of
criminal offenses, for legislatures frequently incorporate criteria of ex-
culpation and sentence enhancement or mitigation into the statutory
definition of the offense. 259 Therefore, the adoption of a substantive
approach to defining criminal offenses ought to be encouraged if one
desires to preserve these foundational distinctions and to not abdicate
to the legislature the power to determine the scope of the "beyond a
reasonable doubt doctrine."
253. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
254. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
255. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
256. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
257. See supra Part III(B).
258. See supra Part III(B).
259. See definition of murder according to the UCMJ and see supra Part III(B). Ac-
cording to Article 118 of the UCMJ, a person is guilty of murder if a person intentionally
and "without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being."
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B. THE "UNLAWFUL ACT" APPROACH TO DEFINING CRIMINAL
OFFENSES
There are many ways of defining criminal offenses for the pur-
poses of In re Winship'S2 60 "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine. Con-
sonant with the comprehensive approach to defining crimes,261 for
example, an offense could be conceived as including every element
that may impact the defendant's punishment, including the absence of
justification and excuse-defenses, and, perhaps, the presence or ab-
sence of mitigating or aggravating factors. Contrarily, pursuant to the
"basic wrong" approach to criminal offenses, an offense could also be
considered to include solely the minimal amount of elements needed
to inculpate the actor. 2 6 2 This would exclude from the definition of
the offense both the absence of justification and excuse defenses and
the presence of sentencing factors that aggravate or mitigate
punishment.
While the plausibility of these two approaches is undeniable, cer-
tain objections may be leveled against each. The comprehensive ap-
proach may be objected as too harsh on the prosecution, for it requires
them to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only the contravention of
the prohibitory norm and the absence of justification defenses, but
also the absence of excuse defenses. This might go too far. In light of
the predominantly subjective nature of most excuse defenses (for ex-
ample, insanity, extreme emotional disturbance, mistake of law, mis-
taken justification),26 3 one may argue that the defendant is usually in
a much better position to argue in favor of the defendant's concur-
rence. Therefore, it might be sensible to impose the burden to prove
such claims on the defendant.
In contrast, some may object to the "basic wrong" approach as too
harsh on the defendant, for the approach would require the defendant
prove not only the concurrence of excuse defenses, but also the pres-
ence of claims of justification. This is problematic for two reasons.
260. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
261. See supra Part III(D).
262. See supra Part III(B).
263. What is meant by the claim that excuses are "predominantly" subjective in na-
ture is that excuse defenses typically take the defendant's subjective mental state more
into account than justification defenses. In other words, when examining whether the
defendant ought to be excused we are allowed to inquire upon the characteristics of the
defendant in a much more personal and individualized way than we are allowed to do in
the realm of justifications. See generally George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of
Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1974). A possible exception might be the
excuse of duress, which calls for the eminently objective assessment of whether a "per-
son of reasonable firmness" would have also committed the crime. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.09 (2002).
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First, justification defenses are mostly objective in nature.264 There-
fore, requiring the government to disprove the presence of justifica-
tory circumstances does not appear to unduly burden the prosecution.
Second, and more importantly, it would seem that if the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" doctrine is to mean anything, it must, at a very
minimum, stand for the proposition that the State ought to be re-
quired to prove the presence of the elements without which the impo-
sition of punishment would be incoherent. That is, the state should at
least have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's
conduct amounted to a violation of legal rules.265
Without proof that the defendant violated a legal rule, the imposi-
tion of punishment is unintelligible. This can be inferred from H.L.A.
Hart's conception of punishment, since he stressed that one of the es-
sential features of punishment is that it must be imposed "for an of-
fence against legal rules."266 It follows then, that a sanction imposed
for something other than the violation of legal rules is not only unjust,
but also incoherent. Ultimately, the infliction of pain in the absence of
a violation of legal rules amounts to a random act of violence rather
than punishment.267 If the "beyond a reasonable doubt" doctrine is
meant to in some way safeguard the defendant against the unwar-
ranted imposition of penal sanctions, it should at least protect the de-
264. What is meant by the claim that justifications are "mostly" objective is merely
that subjective factors are not taken into account as much in this context as they are in
the context of excuses. The Author does not wish to imply, however, that subjective
considerations are never taken into account in the realm ofjustification. As Kent Green-
awalt has demonstrated, justifications sometimes do encompass a subjective compo-
nent, whereas excuses sometimes include objective components. Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLum. L. REv. 1897 (1984). The
point that is being made here is a more modest and less controversial one: that most
excuse defenses typically require corroborating the concurrence of more subjective ele-
ments than one would typically be required to corroborate in order to establish the exis-
tence of a justification defense.
265. Focusing solely on the difficulties of proof that negating some defenses presents
might lead someone to defend a different approach than the one defended here. Under
this competing approach, the question to be asked is whether X defense is very difficult
for the state to disprove because it is eminently subjective in nature or for some other
reason. If the defense is particularly difficult to disprove, it could be argued that the
state should not have the burden of disproving its concurrence beyond a reasonable
doubt regardless ofwhether it is a justification or excuse. This analysis would have to be
made on a case by case basis.
Even though this approach is plausible, it might be too difficult for courts to man-
age on a case by case basis. Therefore, drawing the line between justifications and ex-
cuses for the purposes of burdens of proof is more sensible. After all, in light of the
predominantly objective nature ofjustifications, these types of defenses are usually eas-
ier to disprove than excuses. Therefore, drawing a bright line between justifications
and excuses for the purposes of the beyond a reasonable doubt doctrine comes close to
achieving what the competing approach is supposed to achieve.
266. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1967).
267. The author has defended this claim in more detail elsewhere. See Normative
Gaps, supra note 149, at 106-07.
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fendant as much as possible against the prospect of being punished for
engaging in conduct that does not even amount to a violation of legal
rules. The contrary would amount to putting up with the arbitrary
infliction of pain. This surely cannot be tolerated by our system of
criminal justice.
When does conduct amount to a "violation of legal rules" so that
imposing punishment for such conduct becomes logically plausible in
the "Hartian" sense? Although Hart has little to say about this, it
would seem that conduct can amount to a violation of legal rules in
this context only if it is in contravention of a prohibitory norm and is
not authorized pursuant to a permissive norm. Although in some con-
texts it may be useful to distinguish between conduct that is lawful
because it does not contravene the prohibitory norm and conduct that
is lawful pursuant to a permissive norm that authorizes the contra-
vention of the prohibition, 268 the distinction is not helpful in the con-
text of examining the elements that make the imposition of
punishment logically plausible. It would be as incoherent to impose
punishment on conduct that is lawful because it does not amount to a
contravention of a prohibitory norm as it would be to punish conduct
that is lawful because the contravention of the prohibitory norm is
authorized by a permissive norm.
After all, conduct that is authorized by a permissive norm is con-
duct that, all things being considered, is not prohibited by law. There-
fore, punishment is only coherent if it is imposed for conduct both
satisfying the elements of an offense (contravenes the prohibitory
norm) and not authorized pursuant to a justification defense (author-
ized by a permissive norm). Consequently, if the government ought to
be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements that
make the imposition of punishment logically plausible-as it should-
it follows that the prosecution ought to demonstrate beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant's conduct satisfied the elements of the
offense and that the defendant did so without legal justification to en-
gage in the act.
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE "UNLAWFUL ACT" APPROACH TO
DEFINING CRIMINAL OFFENSES
1. Excuse Defenses and the "Unlawful Act" Approach to Defining
Criminal Offenses
If under the "unlawful act" approach to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" doctrine the government should have the burden of proving
that the defendant engaged in an act that is against legal rules, it
268. See, e.g., Why is it a Crime, supra note 23.
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follows that the prosecution should not have the burden of disproving
excuse-defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Excuse-defenses relieve
the defendant of criminal liability by negating his guilt or culpability
rather than by negating the unlawful nature of the conduct. There-
fore, conduct is against legal rules regardless of whether it is excused
or not.269
Take, for example, the case of insanity. Insane killers are not ac-
quitted because their mental disease or defect negates the unlawful
nature of the killing. Rather, insane defendants are acquitted because
their mental impairment negates their blameworthiness for having
engaged in what amounts to an admittedly unlawful act. The unlaw-
ful nature of crimes committed by insane assailants is highlighted by
the fact that such defendants are held civilly liable for the damages
caused by their conduct. 270 This, of course, is possible precisely be-
cause the wrongful or unlawful nature of the defendant's conduct is
unaffected by the defendant's insanity.271
Once the nature of excuse defenses is grasped, it is easy to see
why punishing excused offenders is not logically problematic. As was
discussed in the previous section, punishment is coherent as long as it
is imposed for the violation of legal rules. Since excused offenders
have, by definition, violated a legal rule, punishing them is perfectly
coherent. This is not to say, however, that punishing excused offend-
ers is fair. In many cases, one may argue that punishing an excused
offender is unjust. Nevertheless, our system of criminal justice in gen-
eral, and the constitutional right to due process in particular, toler-
ates some degree of unfairness.272 Some states, for example, do not
afford to the mentally ill an acquittal for reason of insanity.2 7 3 In
such jurisdictions, the insane defendant will be at the most found
"guilty but mentally ill."2 7 4 Many believe that this is unfair,275 and it
very well might be. This, however, does not mean that such practices
269. See Normative Gaps, supra note 149, at 110-13.
270. This highlights an important but often overlooked difference between tort law
and criminal law. Criminal liability ultimately depends on the defendant's guilt. Tort
liability, on the other hand, depends on wrongdoing irrespective of guilt.
271. In the context of intentional torts, see Colman v. Notre Dame Convalescent
Home, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D. Conn. 1997) (holding that a mentally ill patient
suffering from senile dementia was liable for battery). In the context of negligent torts,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 283 B (1981) (stating that the mentally insane
are held to a standard of sanity).
272. It is hornbook law that due process only precludes practices that are funda-
mentally unfair. Therefore, due process tolerates unfair practices that do not rise to the
level of fundamental unfairness.
273. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (2003).
274. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-26-14 (2004).
275. See generally Stephen Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Recon-
sidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 777 (1985).
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are unconstitutional. It would seem that they are not. Ultimately,
due process does not prohibit "unfair" practices, but rather precludes
the application of rules that produce "fundamental" unfairness. 276
This might help explain why it may make sense to strike the bal-
ance between the risks of unwarranted acquittals and unwarranted
convictions by requiring the prosecution to prove the absence ofjustifi-
cation defenses without requiring it to prove the absence of excuse de-
fenses. While it is true that lowering the prosecution's burden of proof
with regard to excuse-defenses increases the risk of unfair convictions,
the conviction of an offender who should have been excused does not
produce an illogical or incoherent state of affairs. Contrarily, lowering
the government's burden of proof with regard to justification defenses
increases the risk not only of unfair convictions, but of incoherent con-
victions as well. Imposing punishment on a defendant who acted jus-
tifiably is tantamount to punishing someone who did not engage in
conduct that is against legal rules. Punishing such actors would
therefore be more than unfair-it would be arbitrary and illogical. Ul-
timately, punishing such actors would be as arbitrary as punishing
actors who acted lawfully because their conduct did not satisfy the ele-
ments of the offense strictu sensu. It thus makes sense to require the
prosecution to disprove justification defenses in much the same man-
ner as the prosecution is now required to prove the contravention of
the prohibitory norm.
In sum, when deciding how to strike the constitutional balance
between the interests that due process seeks to protect, it could make
sense to hold the prosecution to a higher standard when it comes to
establishing the elements that make the imposition of punishment co-
herent, while holding the prosecution to a (slightly) less demanding
standard when it comes to establishing additional elements that qual-
ify the fairness of the punishment imposed rather than its coherence.
That is, it may be an acceptable compromise to require the prosecution
to disprove justification defenses beyond a reasonable doubt while not
demanding it to disprove excuse defenses in the same manner.
It should be stressed, however, that this is the minimum level of
protection that should be afforded pursuant to the "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" doctrine. Good reasons may exist for requiring the prosecu-
tion to prove more elements than these beyond a reasonable doubt.
There are not, however, good reasons to allow the government-as it
is presently allowed to do-to prove less elements than those that are
necessary to establish the unlawful nature of defendant's act (for ex-
276. Courts have generally held that statutes abolishing the insanity defense are
constitutional. See, e.g., State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851 (Kan. 2003); State v. Herrera,
895 P.2d 359, 366 (Utah 1995).
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ample, infraction of the elements of the offense + absence of
justification).
2. Sentencing Factors and the "Unlawful Act" Approach to Defining
Criminal Offenses
Another implication of the unlawful act approach to defining
criminal offenses is that the prosecution should not have the burden of
proving aggravating sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
The presence or absence of sentencing factors is irrelevant to estab-
lishing the unlawful nature of the defendant's act. By definition, sen-
tence enhancements come into play only after it has been determined
that the defendant engaged in a wrongful act. As a result, these fac-
tors merely qualify the defendant's guilt for having engaged in an ad-
mittedly unlawful act.
It thus seems that lowering the government's burden of proof with
regard to sentencing factors merely increases the likelihood of a con-
viction that may not accurately reflect the degree of culpability exhib-
ited by the defendant during the commission of the crime. While this
risk is certainly not negligible, it is clearly of less significance than the
risk of unfairly convicting a defendant who should have been acquit-
ted as a result of an excuse defense. Therefore, if it is sensible to allow
the prosecution to disprove excuse defenses by a lower standard than
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is a fortiori sensible to allow the govern-
ment to prove the concurrence of sentencing factors by a similar stan-
dard. In other words, if it is acceptable-as the Supreme Court of the
United States has repeatedly held-to water down the government's
burden of proof with regard to the presence of excuse defenses that
may make the difference between full fledged punishment of the de-
fendant and no punishment at all, it should be even more acceptable
to reduce the prosecution's burden of proof regarding the presence of
sentencing factors that merely condition the length of the defendant's
punishment.
D. OVERHAULING THE SUPREME COURT'S "BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT" JURISPRUDENCE
At first glance it might seem that the unlawful act approach to
defining criminal offenses is so much at odds with the Supreme Court
of the United States' current approach to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" doctrine that its adoption would require a significant overhaul
of the Court's jurisprudence. Upon closer inspection, however, only
two relatively minor changes need to be made. First, adoption of the
"unlawful act" approach should lead to overruling the Court's decision
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in Martin v. Ohio277 to allow the state government to shift the burden
of proving self-defense to the defendant. Given that self-defense is a
justification, its concurrence negates the unlawfulness of defendant's
act. Therefore, inflicting suffering on a defendant who acted in self-
defense entails punishing him for engaging in conduct that does not
even amount to a violation of legal rules. This is not only unfair, but
incoherent. If the constitutional right to have the government prove
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt is to have any
bite, it must at least stand for the proposition that the prosecution
ought to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements that make the
defendant's conduct a violation of a legal rule. Whether the fact at
issue amounts to a positive (the elements of the offense strictu sensu)
or negative (the absence of justification) element of the offense should
be of no constitutional significance in this context.
In contrast, for the reasons discussed in the previous section, the
cases holding that the prosecution does not have to disprove excuse
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt are all compatible with the un-
lawful act approach defended in this Article. Therefore, adoption of
this approach does not require modifying most of the post-In re Win-
ship'S278 burden of proof cases, including Patterson v. New York, 279
Leland v. Oregon280 and Dixon v. United States.281
Furthermore, the Court should expressly state what it appears to
be tacitly suggesting in its more recent sentencing factor case law.
The jury trial right and due process Winship aspects of the so-called
Apprendi v. New Jersey282 rule ought to be disentangled. Given that
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to every aspect of a
"criminal prosecution," it makes sense to hold-as the Court has
done-that the defendant has a right to have a jury find the presence
of aggravating factors that may have an impact on the length of his
sentence. This fact, however, should have no bearing on whether the
prosecution ought to prove the presence of such factors beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. For the reasons discussed in the previous section, it
makes sense to allow the government to prove the existence of aggra-
vating factors by a lesser standard. If the prosecution is not required
to disprove excuse defenses beyond a reasonable doubt, there is little
reason to require them to prove sentencing factors in that manner.
277. 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
278. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
279. 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that excuse defense of extreme emotional distur-
bance does not trigger Winship protection).
280. 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (holding that excuse defense of insanity does not trigger
Winship protection).
281. 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (holding that excuse defense of duress does not trigger Win-
ship protection).
282. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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A close reading of Apprendi and its progeny reveals that what the
Court is truly worried about in those cases is the scope of the jury trial
right afforded by the Sixth Amendment and its possible application to
sentencing proceedings. This issue is of little relevance to the sepa-
rate matter concerning the scope of the beyond a reasonable doubt
rule. By adopting the "unlawful act" approach to defining criminal of-
fenses for the purposes of Winship, the Court can coherently explain
what a close reading of recent sentencing factor cases seem to hint
at-that the jury should find sentencing factors, although the govern-
ment need not prove these factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States' approach to the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" doctrine remains mired in confusion nearly forty
years after In re Winship283 was decided. Most of the confusion can be
traced back to the Court's failure to come to grips with the offense/
defense/sentencing factor tristinction. By not recognizing the interre-
lationship that exists between these three elements, the Court fell
prey to a fundamental inconsistency. The Court defined criminal of-
fenses in a formalistic manner for the purpose of distinguishing of-
fenses from defenses, while simultaneously defined offenses in a non-
formalistic manner when differentiating offenses from sentencing fac-
tors. Unless sound reasons are put forth in favor of adopting such a
schizophrenic approach to defining criminal offenses for the purposes
of the Winship rule, this approach should be rejected.
This Article has proposed the "unlawful act" approach as an alter-
native account of criminal offenses in the context of the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" doctrine. According to this theory, an offense for the
purposes of Winship should include both the elements comprising the
prohibitory norm (do not kill!) and the absence of elements making up
permissive norms that authorize the contravention of the prohibitory
norm (you may kill in self-defense!). If-as is unanimously believed-
the government ought to prove the contravention of the prohibitory
norm (do not kill) beyond a reasonable doubt, it must also be de-
manded that it prove the absence of a permissive norm authorizing
the conduct by recourse to the same standard. Ultimately, punishing
a defendant without proof that his conduct contravened a prohibition
and punishing him without proof that the conduct was not authorized
pursuant to a permissive norm amounts to the perpetration of the
same evil-punishing a human being for engaging in conduct that
does not even amount to a violation of legal rules. This is unaccept-
283. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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able. Therefore, the government ought to at the very least be required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the elements of the offense
strictu sensu and the absence of justification. Contrarily, given that
the presence or absence of excuse defenses and sentencing factors has
no bearing on the unlawfulness of the act, it may be argued that the
burden of proof with regard to these elements ought to differ from the
one that should attach to elements of the offense and justification
defenses.
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